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Abstract 
This study has been performed to understand the potential impact that the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) Order No. 841 will have on the adoption of 
energy storage resources (ESR).  This analysis looked at: (1) the Order’s requirements, 
(2) FERC’s exercise of its authorized jurisdiction within the Order, and (3) actions taken 
by the Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO), Independent System Operators 
(ISO) and FERC to demonstrate compliance with the Order’s requirements: 
Order No. 841 utilizes a participation model to ensure ESR’s are able to participate in 
wholesale electricity markets to an extent that is reflective of a resource’s physical and 
operation characteristics.  The model’s effect on market competition will be achieved 
primarily through a greater realization of merchant value by ESR owners.  However, 
economically optimal levels of ESR capacity and service provision will likely not be 
achieved through exclusive use of participation models. 
Realization of ESR benefits will be heavily dependent on the long-term resilience of the 
market changes implemented by the Order.  FERC’s reliance on a conventional 
exercise of its jurisdiction over interstate wholesale markets can creating unnecessary 
regulatory uncertainty, or miss opportunities for State-level engagement to maintain the 
momentum that Order No. 841 provides to ESR participation. 
Key aspects of the RTO/ISO’s compliance plans were tabulated and analyzed.  
RTO/ISO’s may need to further justify the use of proposed indirect controls to manage 
ESR physical parameters.  Additionally, the widespread use of “dispatch-only” 
participation models may present participation barriers for some storage technologies.  
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Chapter 1 Electricity Storage and Wholesale Electricity Markets 
1.1 Early Federal Regulatory Considerations 
In June, 2010, the Director of the Office of Energy Policy and Innovation (OEPI) opened 
Docket No. AD10-13-000 to gather comments pertinent to rates, accounting and 
financial reporting for new electric storage technologies.  The OEPI, an office within the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), is tasked with coordinating “the 
development of policies and rules that address emerging challenges” relevant to the 
electric industry (FERC, 2019a).  Aspects of this coordination include provision of policy 
recommendations derived from energy market analysis, as well as identification of 
regulatory barriers to greater implementation of innovations in the electric industry.  In 
this docket, OEPI and, by extension, FERC acknowledged the growing technological 
maturity and commercial operation of newer storage technologies, and sought to 
understand how to “develop rates and categorize electric storage costs for rate 
purposes” (FERC, 2010). 
Participation of these new storage technologies in electric markets within the scope of 
FERC’s jurisdiction (i.e., interstate wholesale markets), was not viewed as a simple 
exercise of mimicking the treatment of existing electric system elements (FERC, 2010).  
For example, pumped hydroelectric storage (PHES), had provided energy storage 
within the US electric system for approximately 80 years by the time Docket No. AD10-
13-000 was opened.  For much of this time, PHES resources did not represent a novel 
component of the grid or require innovative compensation methods for provision of 
services.  In fact, this class of storage resources was primarily developed to occupy the 
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traditional role of a transmission-level interconnected energy generation asset.  As 
illustrated in Figure 1-1, most of the current US PHES capacity was commissioned in 
the 1960’s and 1970’s in order to provide peak energy in place of fossil fuel generation 
as a response to energy shortages that occurred starting in the 1960’s (Barbour, 
Wilson, Radcliffe, Ding, & Li, 2016; Uria-Martinez, Johnson, & O'Connor, 2018; Yang & 
Jackson, 2011). 
 
Figure 1-1: Growth of US PHES Capacity 
(USDOE, 2018)1 
With the PHES capacity owned and operated under the vertically integrated utility model 
dominant at the time, mechanisms beyond the standard cost-of-service model were also 
not needed to compensate PHES participation in wholesale markets (FERC, 2010).  
The size, capacity and siting flexibility provided by newer storage technologies, in 
                                                          
1 Commissioning dates for the Hiwassee Dam and the Rocky Mountain Hydroelectric Plant were not 
included in (USDOE, 2018), and were separately obtained (EIA, 2019b). 
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addition to lower capital costs, allowed these new storage classes to potentially inhabit 
any of the traditional electric system asset categories (i.e., generation-, transmission-, 
and distribution-level) in addition to serving in roles usually attributed to system loads. 
The Commission subsequently undertook several rule making efforts impacting electric 
storage resource participation in wholesale markets, presumably informed by the 
insights gleaned from the 2010 Request for Comments.  These efforts, while steps in 
the right direction to removing barriers to such participation, essentially nibbled around 
the edges of the physical and operational capabilities of electric storage resources.  
Specifically, two resulting final rules addressed storage resource compensation (FERC, 
2011c, 2013a) for ancillary services only.  A third rule was limited to including electric 
storage devices in the pro forma interconnection agreements and procedures for Small 
Generators (FERC, 2013b), defined as “devices used for the production of electricity 
having a capacity of no more than 20 megawatts” (FERC, 2005). 
1.2 Intervening Energy Storage Innovations and Evolution: 2010 – 2016 
The intervening years had seen continued changes related to electric storage: (1) a 
range of cost-effective electric storage projects became operational from 2010-2016 
leveraging a variety of storage technologies, (2) state-level mandates for storage 
procurement had been implemented in various states, and (3) an evolving realization of 
electric storage’s capability to facilitate increased renewable energy penetration.  
Specific examples of these changes are further detailed below. 
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Commissioning of New Commercial Storage Technologies 
Figure 1-2 provides an overview of evolving distribution of storage technologies that 
was being commissioned in the US between 2010 and 2016.  The total nameplate 
storage capacity only increased by approximately 10% over this period.  At the same 
time, new categories of storage technologies, as well as new variants of existing 
storage technology categories became sufficiently mature to achieve commercialization.  
While each still represented less than 1% of the nation’s 2016 electric storage capacity, 
flywheel (mechanical and concentrated solar generation coupled with molten salt 
storage projects both moved from demonstration stages into the realm of larger-scale 
commercialized assets.  Advances in materials science (e.g., carbon fiber rotor 
fabrication) and flywheel design enabled the commissioning of flywheel facilities with up 
to 20 MW capacity in New York and Pennsylvania starting in 2011.  Only two years 
later, new heat transfer fluids (i.e., molten salts) were deployed in 2013 in the first 
operational US commercial concentrated solar facility to be coupled with storage in 
order to provide more reliable energy supply through all hours of the day.   
Introduction of battery storage followed a somewhat different path, but the maturing of 
relevant technologies still resulting in the converging introduction of new commercial 
storage resources during the early 2010’s.  Batteries providing storage in the form of 
electrochemical energy were available prior to the creation of the US electric grid in the 
late nineteenth century; rechargeable lead-acid batteries were first invented in 1859, 
whereas Edison’s Pearl Street Station, the first commercial central power state in the 
US, began generation in 1882.  However, there are limited examples prior to 2010 
where such batteries were used in larger-scale generator-type roles.  In such cases,  
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Figure 1-2: Comparison of 2010 and 2016 Operational US Storage Capacity 
(EIA, 2010, 2016b) 
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storage media based on lead-acid and sodium-sulfur chemistries were the primary type 
of battery technology employed.  With the maturity of lithium-based batteries after 2010, 
the majority of new storage resource installations in the US, covering a wide range of 
facility capacities, have utilized a variety of lithium-based technologies.  Other battery 
storage technologies have also been commercialized (e.g., flow batteries), but lithium-
based batteries have truly come to dominate the battery storage landscape, 
representing almost two-thirds of current operational battery installations (DOE 
database). 
State-Level Storage Mandates 
From 2010 through early 2018, state-level legislative action began to focus on the 
introduction of storage procurement targets.  These legislative efforts were aimed at 
state entities authorized to regulate aspects of the state electricity markets, and typically 
took the form of directives to assess the benefit of storage procurement mandates, and 
where deemed necessary, to establish specific target procurement levels and timelines.  
As detailed in Table 1-1, by the end of 2017, five states had either tasked their state 
regulatory boards with assessing procurement targets or targets had been established, 
with achievement of the targets occurring no later than 2020. 
Facilitation of Higher Renewable Energy Penetration Levels 
During this period, a variety of real-world experiences provided a window into the needs 
of an electric grid attempting to achieve high levels of renewable energy penetration. 
Renewable generation resources such as wind and solar generation require the 
introduction of additional levels of system flexibility to counterbalance the intermittent 
nature of the associated generation (Kristov, 2015).  Conventional electric grid elements  
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Table 1-1: State-Level Electric Storage Legislation and Mandates Enacted Prior to 2018 
State Legislative 
Bill 
Effective Date Mandate Details Reference 
California AB2514 Sept 29, 2010 California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) is 
directed to determine appropriate targets for each load-
serving entity to procure energy storage systems to be 
achieved by 2015 and 2020 
CPUC set procurement target of 1325 MW by 2020 
(AB2514, 2010)  
 
 
(CPUC, 2013) 
AB2868 Sept 26, 2016 The CPUC can approve up to 500 MW of distribution-
connected or behind-the-meter (BTM) energy storage.   
No more than 25% of energy storage capacity can be 
provided by BTM energy storage 
(AB2868, 2016) 
Oregon HB2193 Jun 10, 2015 Electric companies with at least 25000 retail customers 
to procure one or more energy storage system with a 
capacity of at least 5MWh energy by Jan, 2020 
(HB 2193, 2015) 
Massachusetts H.4568 Aug 8, 2016 Department of Energy Resources is directed to 
determine whether to set January, 2020 procurement 
targets for energy storage systems 
(H. 4568, 2016) 
Nevada SB204 Jul 1, 2017 Nevada Public Utilities Commission is directed to 
determine, on or before October 1, 2018, whether to 
establish biennial energy storage procurement targets 
(SB204, 2017) 
New York AB6571 Mar 9, 2017 New York Public Service Commission is directed to set 
a 2030 target for storage procurement 
Set a target of 1325 GW by 2020. 
(A6571, 2017) 
 
(NYDPS, 2018) 
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can be leveraged to provide generation- or transmission-related flexibility.  For example, 
Germany’s energy transition efforts (i.e., Energiewende) enable generation of 27% of all 
electricity from renewable sources by 2014, while continuing to work towards supplying 
80% of electricity from renewable sources (Pollitt & Anaya, 2016).  In this case, system 
flexibility was provided by leveraging existing robust transmission capacity to 
neighboring countries that accommodated export of excess generation and reduced the 
need to curtail wind and solar generation. 
Conversely, regions with existing constraints preventing over-reliance on such 
conventional solutions must instead seek alternate approaches to ensuring sufficient 
grid flexibility is maintained as the transition to greater renewable energy occurs.  
Introduction of electric storage resources is one path that can be taken to provide 
sufficient system flexibility.  New York State’s launch the Reforming the Energy Vision in 
2014 (New York State, 2019) provides such an example.  Seeking to create a cleaner, 
more resilient and affordable energy system for New York, the program has established 
a target to obtain 50% of all electricity from renewable energy sources by 2030.  
However, significant transmission constraints exist within the state, preventing the 
abundant upstate, zero-emission resources from being available for use in the 
downstate region where fossil fuels generation provided close to three quarters of all 
electricity generation in 2016 (NYISO, 2017).  One approach that New York taken to 
address reliability concerns associated with high renewable energy penetration was to 
explicitly include energy storage procurement targets in their planning to achieve the 
2030 renewable energy goals.   
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1.3 Issuance of Order No. 841 
The Commission found itself concurrently engaged in issuing orders on a case-by-case 
basis that impacted aspects of electric storage wholesale market participation (FERC, 
2016)2.  The final rules pertaining to storage resource compensation for ancillary 
services mentioned above are two such examples (FERC, 2011c, 2013a).  Also, some 
Independent System Operators (ISO’s) and Regional Transmission Organizations 
(RTO’s) had independently begun work on wholesale market tariff updates that would 
permit broader electric storage resources to provide a broad range of grid services3.  In 
whole, these technical, regulatory and economic developments caused concern within 
FERC that storage resources were facing “barriers that limit them from participating in 
organized wholesale electric markets” (FERC, 2016)4.   
Moving forward to November 2016, FERC issued a Notice for Proposed Rulemaking 
(NOPR) seeking to address a broader, more ambitious goal; a general effort to remove 
barriers to participation of electric storage resources in organized wholesale electric 
markets (FERC, 2016)5.  Following receipt of stakeholder comments on the proposed 
rule elements in the NOPR and the subsequent rule draft, the Final Rule, as detailed in 
Order No. 841 (Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional 
Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators), was published in the 
                                                          
2 At Paragraph 6 
3 As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) had worked for 
a number of years on developing the new Non-Generator Resource (NGR), which was designed 
specifically for energy storage resources. 
4 At Paragraph 7 
5 The 2016 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking also sought to remove barriers to wholesale electricity market 
participation of distributed energy resource aggregations.  FERC indicated in the Final Rule for Order No. 
841 that further efforts to define rules for aggregations would be moved to a separate docket, as 
discussed in Section 2.4: Key Out-of-Scope Topics 
10 | P a g e  
 
Federal Register on March 6, 2018, and became effective on June 4, 2018 (FERC, 
2018).  In line with the compliance requirements, RTO/ISO’s were required to submit 
compliance plan six months after the Final Rule’s effective date to demonstrate that 
their proposal will satisfy the associated requirements.  RTO/ISO’s are then permitted 
twelve months after the compliance plan filing to implement their respective proposed 
market reforms detailed in the plans. 
1.4 Research Topic Overview 
The goal of this project is to begin to develop an understanding of the potential impact 
that Order No. 841’s Final Rule will have on the participation of electric storage 
resources (ESR) in US wholesale electricity markets.  This is a timely topic, given that 
the Order only became effective within the past year, and RTO/ISO’s have yet to 
receive approval of the compliance plans submitted in early December, 2018. 
The method by which this understanding can begin to be established will consist of 
analyzing the components of the Order, the Commission’s exercise of its authorized 
jurisdiction within the Order, and the actions taken by the RTO/ISO’s and FERC to 
demonstrate compliance with the Final Rule requirements: 
1. Final Rule Requirements and Participation Model Effectiveness: The key 
requirements contained within the Final Rule will be outlined.  This assessment 
will be accompanied by a consideration of unresolved topics determined to be 
out of scope of the Final Rule that may represent significant future challenges to 
the envisioned electric storage participation.  The use of participation models as 
a means of enabling optimal provision of grid services by electric storage 
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resources will be reviewed in order to the determine the likelihood of the Final 
Rule being suitable for its intended purpose. 
2. Final Rule Legal Foundations and Jurisdictional Perspectives: FERC’s 
jurisdictional claims outlined in the Final Rule will be identified and discussed in 
the context of relevant precedents, including previous judicial decisions and 
similar Commission-issued rules.  The ability of FERC’s approach to jurisdictional 
claims to provide a sustainable regulatory regime will be discussed along with 
potential challenges faced by the modern electric grid arising from such 
approaches. 
3. RTO/ISO Compliance Plans and Initial Commission Responses: Key aspects 
of the recently proposed compliance plans will be summarized to identify and 
categorize approaches taken to achieve compliance with the Final Rule by the 
RTO/ISO’s.  These plans will also be reviewed in the context of the compliance 
deficiency letters recently issued by FERC as an avenue to gain insight on the 
likely viability of the proposed plans. 
It is critical to broaden the understanding of the viability and impact of these Order-
driven changes on the rate of ESR adoption, and by extension, increased renewable 
energy penetration on a national level.  This interaction amongst resilience of the Final 
Rule requirements, wholesale market participation and continued ESR adoption is 
therefore of interest to all stakeholders impacted by renewable energy resource 
adoption: ESR developers and owners, energy policy and regulatory bodies at the state 
and federal levels, energy customers, and transmission/distribution/generation system 
owners. 
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Chapter 2 Overview of FERC Order No. 841 
2.1 Introduction 
An understanding of the elements of Order No. 841, is critical to assessing the impact it 
will have on the adoption of electric storage resources in the US electric system.  
However, such Orders provided by the Commission are not just a simple prescriptive list 
of instructions for impacted entities to follow.  The Orders also provide key stakeholder 
comments taken into consideration when formulating the Commission’s determinations 
on specific aspects of the Order.  Additional interpretive details and clarifications are 
typically provided to aid in the execution the Order’s requirements.  Such additional 
information serves as a demonstration that the associated prescriptions are neither 
arbitrary nor capricious (i.e., avoiding the risk of subsequent judicial review for 
lawfulness), while enabling consistent compliance by entities falling within FERC’s 
jurisdiction on the relevant matters. 
Despite such intentions, the richness of content present in many of the Commission’s 
Orders can be daunting to more casual readers, or obscure critical details central to a 
more focused analysis.  In an effort to establish a relatively concise foundation on which 
subsequent analytical discussions will be built, an initial summarization and 
classification of the Order’s elements provides a beneficial first step towards achieving 
the current study’s goals.  As such, this chapter will provide a summary of: (1) the 
elements and requirements of Order No. 841, and (2) key unresolved items related to 
future storage resource participation.  Additionally, the modes by which FERC’s focus 
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on participation models in the Order can impact energy storage capacity deployment will 
be discussed. 
2.2 Tariff Revisions and Participation Models 
At a high level, the Final Rule issued in Order No. 841 (referred to subsequently in this 
Chapter as the “Final Rule”) simply requires an update to existing tariffs maintained by 
the nation’s RTO’s and ISO’s by incorporating an additional participation model.  With 
this in mind, the roles of tariffs and participation models, as used in wholesale electric 
markets, deserve some further discussion. 
RTO/ISO’s maintain tariffs that outline provided services, rates and charges for those 
services, and rules and regulations affecting these services, rates and charges. These 
tariffs are required to be filed with, and are subject to hearings for lawfulness by FERC 
(Federal Power Act, 1935).  It is within these tariffs that the RTO/ISO’s set forth 
wholesale market operational and participation procedures for defined services.  The 
Final Rule explicitly revises FERC regulations to require RTO/ISO’s to update their 
current tariffs to include market rules facilitating participation of a new resource: Electric 
Storage Resource.   
In the context of wholesale electric markets, FERC refers to participation models as 
tariff provisions that are applicable to a specific class of resources.  These provisions 
are included when a class of resources requires distinctive treatment in order to 
accommodate or leverage its unique physical or operational characteristics (FERC, 
2018)6.  The Commission views implementation of such models as a mechanism for 
                                                          
6 At Paragraph 3 
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removing barriers to participation, enhancing competition, and ensuring just and 
reasonable prices (FERC, 2018)7. 
Four required elements of the participation model were stipulated within the Final Rule.  
These elements are summarized in Table 2-1.  An additional general tariff revision was 
also stipulated that is related to the prices at which ESR’s are to be charged for energy 
purchased for later resale within the wholesale market. 
Table 2-1: ESR Participation Model Elements 
Element Name Element Description 
Service provision 
eligibility 
Assurance of ESR eligibility to provide all wholesale market 
services (i.e., energy, capacity and ancillary services) that it 
is technically capable of providing 
Wholesale market 
price setting 
Assurance that ESR’s can be dispatched and set the market 
price as the marginal energy injecting of withdrawing 
resources (i.e., as both a buyer and a seller of electric 
market services) 
Market bidding 
parameters 
Accounting for physical and operational characteristics of 
the ESR in market bidding parameters 
Minimum resource size 
Establishes a minimum resource capacity, above which 
RTO/ISO’s must allow qualifying resources to use the ESR 
participation model 
2.2.1 ESR Definition, Qualification and General Participation 
The first required element of the ESR participation model focuses more on the basic 
aspects of ESR’s and foundational concepts to be achieved by the participation models.  
The key aspects of this element include: (1) defining an ESR, (2) outlining requirements 
                                                          
7 At Paragraph 4 
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to qualify a resource as an ESR, (3) an understanding of technical capability within the 
context of the Final Rule, and (4) the relationship between various participation models 
that may already be available to storage resources. 
ESR Definition 
Prior to proscribing detailed elements of the new participation model, the Final Rule 
establishes an explicit definition for ESR’s to clarify which resources may utilize the 
associated participation model (FERC, 2018)8.  The Final Rule thus provides the 
following definition: 
Electric Storage Resource: A resource capable of receiving electric energy from the 
grid and storing it for later injection of electric energy back to the grid. 
Incorporated within this definition are two implied elements.  First, the definition lacks 
any mention of underlying storage technology or medium, but instead focuses only on 
the capability to withdraw, store and inject energy to the grid.  Thus, this effectively 
technology-agnostic definition should remain relevant as new storage technologies are 
developed and commercialized.  Second, the definition does not proscribe the location 
in which an ESR can reside within the electric system.  Any storage resource, whether 
interconnected at the transmission-, distribution- or behind-the-meter-level, is capable of 
meeting the ESR definition and utilizing the corresponding participation model for 
wholesale electricity sales.  However, while providing wholesale market participation 
opportunities for a wide range of storage resources, as will be discuss in Chapter 4, this 
                                                          
8 At Paragraph 29 
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element of the definition may introduce jurisdictional challenges in execution of the Final 
Rule. 
Having the ability to both withdraw and inject energy to the grid are central to the ESR 
definition.  To emphasize this, the Final Rule clarifies that even resources capable of 
both operations, if constrained by its operational configuration or contractual obligations 
to only withdraw or inject energy to the grid, would not meet the elements of the ESR 
definition (FERC, 2018)9.  Indeed, the Final Rule points out the specific instance of 
behind-the-meter storage resources capable of only withdrawing energy that would not 
qualify as ESR’s, but rather demand response resources for which distinct participation 
models are already available (FERC, 2008b, 2011b). 
ESR Qualification 
The Final Rule also requires tariffs to include qualification criteria that provide clear 
eligibility requirements for wholesale market participation as an ESR.  In alignment with 
the ESR definition, these qualification criteria need to be based on the physical and 
operational attributes of a resource, in addition to assuring resource dispatchability 
corresponding to these attributes (FERC, 2018)10.  Beyond an expectation that 
qualification criteria themselves not introduce barriers to market participation, greater 
proscriptive requirements on the criteria were avoided with the intention of providing 
RTO/ISO’s with a degree of flexibility to ease incorporation of the ESR participation 
model into their varied wholesale market structures (FERC, 2018)11. 
                                                          
9 At Paragraph 32 
10 At Paragraph 61 
11 At Paragraph 62 
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Technical Requirements to Provide Services and ESR Capabilities 
The Final Rule repeatedly emphasizes the need for ESR participation models to allow 
such resources to offer services that they are technically capable of providing.  This 
range of service is quite expansive, including services procured through organized 
competitive markets (i.e., energy, capacity and ancillary services) and services not 
currently procured through such mechanisms (e.g., black start service, primary 
frequency response, reactive power, etc.), with all service provision requiring 
compensation commensurate with the service provided (FERC, 2018)12.  One could 
question whether introduction of a new participation model will introduce an 
unwarranted preference to procure services from ESR’s.  On the contrary, the Final 
Rule’s stated goal is to simply remove barriers to ESR participation, thereby enhancing 
competition among all resources that are technically capable of providing a given 
service (FERC, 2018)13.  There are no general requirements to modify technical 
requirements that resources need to meet to provide specific services.  ESR’s instead 
must be capable of meeting all existing technical requirements, presumably applicable 
to all other potential service providers, to ensure reliable provision of such services 
(FERC, 2018)14.   
An allowance provided to ESR’s to meet specific technical requirements for services is 
the ability to de-rate its capacity, relative to the rated nameplate capacity, in order to 
meet minimum run-time requirements, primarily for providing capacity services (FERC, 
                                                          
12 At Paragraph 70 
13 At Paragraph 52 
14 At Paragraph 77 
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2018)15.  As an example, a unit capable of storing 1000 kWh of energy providing power 
at its nameplate rating of 500 kW can provide this power for up to 2 hours.  De-rating 
would allow the unit to offer a lower power output so that it could meet longer run-times 
(e.g., 250 kW output for 4 hours) typically needed to meet the technical requirements of 
various services.  This allowance therefore leaves in place the technical requirement 
needed to ensure reliable provision of given service, in this case capacity, while 
permitting ESR participation that is reflective of the resource’s operational and physical 
characteristics (i.e., the ability to deliver its full energy capacity at lower power). 
Relationship Between ESR’s and Other Participation Models 
Neither participation as an ESR nor wholesale market participation in general is 
required of potentially qualifiable storage resources under any mandates within the Final 
Rule; both actions are voluntary (FERC, 2018)16.  In an effort to avoid unnecessary 
disruptions to the RTO/ISO’s and resource owners, the Final Rule clarifies that any 
existing participation models already available to storage resources (e.g., for pumped 
hydroelectric storage or demand response) need not be consolidated with the newer 
ESR model.  Therefore, storage resources are free to continue operating under 
participation models to which they were previously qualified for, if so desired.  Qualifying 
storage resources may also choose to not be a direct party in wholesale market 
transactions.  The Final Rule clarifies this allowance with at least an implicit 
understanding that some resource owners may not wish to bear the burden of meeting 
                                                          
15 At Paragraph 93 
16 At Paragraph 55 
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the wholesale market participant responsibilities17 called for in FERC’s rules and 
regulations. 
2.2.2 Roles and Dispatch of ESR’s 
Having established the required core elements of what is to be considered an ESR, the 
Final Rule proceeds to outline details of the second element of the corresponding 
participation model.  These details are largely related to roles ESR’s may play in 
providing specific services, the associated dispatch process, and ESR compensation for 
non-economic dispatch. 
ESR Roles in Service Provision 
Most elements of the electric system are capable of either primarily injecting or 
withdrawing energy from the grid.  These system elements would then inhabit the roles 
of either supply or demand (i.e., load), respectively, in electric markets.  Given the 
capabilities of storage resources permitting both electricity withdrawal and injection, 
ESR’s have the flexibility to play both supply- and demand-type roles in wholesale 
markets.  Recognizing this flexibility, the Final Rule provides clear requirements that the 
participation models must ensure the ability of ESR’s to be dispatched by RTO/ISO’s as 
either a supply or demand in wholesale markets (FERC, 2018)18.  As an extension to 
this dispatchability requirement, the participation models need to include the ability of 
                                                          
17 As stated in footnote 50 of the Final Rule (FERC, 2018), regulated responsibilities of participating 
resources may include filing rates, submitting information related to corporate activities and fulfilling 
accounting obligations, as dictated in the FPA. 
18 At Paragraph 140 
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dispatched ESR’s to set market clearing prices, consistent with existing market price 
setting rules, through both wholesale market buyer and seller bids. 
ESR Dispatch Process 
One challenge faced by an ESR’s dual roles is avoiding conflicting dispatch instructions 
with the same market interval, as this may introduce operational uncertainties or 
reliability concerns (FERC, 2018)19.  It is possible to reduce the likelihood of such 
conflicting signals by avoiding requirements for ESR to provide simultaneous supply 
and demand bids for a given market interval or through appropriate design of bid 
parameters.  Flexibility is provided to the RTO/ISO’s to address residual operational 
risks resulting from conflicting bid and dispatch signals in a given market interval.  
Nevertheless, the RTO/ISO’s are required to demonstrate in their tariff update proposals 
how existing or modified market design and rules prevent such conflicts. 
Out-of-Merit Order Dispatch Compensation 
A second consideration detailed in the Final Rule pertains to make-whole (i.e., uplift) 
payments to ESR’s dispatched out of merit order.  Such non-economic dispatch can 
occur to address system reliability, system congestion or to accommodate resource 
operational characteristics (Bresler, 2014), with the extent of such dispatch depending 
on specific electric system and market design features (Bresler, 2014; Pavic, Dvorkin, & 
Pandžic, 2019).  ESR participation models must allow make-whole payments when an 
ESR is dispatched to provide supply at a market price below the resource offer price, as 
is typically done for other resources subject to out-of-merit order dispatch (FERC, 
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2018)20.  Additionally, since ESR’s can serve as dispatchable demand (i.e., load) 
resources, the ESR participation models must allow make-whole payments when ESR’s 
are dispatched to withdraw energy at a market price above the resource’s bid price 
(FERC, 2018)21.  These dual-direction make-whole payments, unique to ESR 
participation models, are considered necessary to ensure ESR’s are treated like other 
dispatchable resources, while also removing potential economic disincentives when 
dispatched to address reliability concerns. 
2.2.3 ESR Market Bidding Parameters and State of Charge Management 
RTO/ISO’s use a variety of information to calculate economically-optimized dispatch 
schedules for system resources.  As an example, traditional generators submit bid 
curves to communicate the quantities of energy they are willing to provide at a given 
price for specific market intervals.  The RTO/ISO’s risk developing dispatch schedules 
that, while economically optimal, may be infeasible to execute due to a lack of 
accounting for physical and operational constraints of the dispatched resources.  
Generators thus provide a variety of additional bidding parameters (e.g., ramping rates, 
minimum run times, etc.) reflective of their specific operational characteristics that the 
RTO/ISO utilize to develop feasible dispatch schedules. 
Application of existing bidding parameters used for traditional generation resources, or 
for participation models developed around provision of a narrow set of services (e.g., 
frequency regulation, demand response, etc.), would limit ESR market participation to 
providing limited services or risk infeasible dispatch instructions.  Both outcomes would 
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inhibit an ESR’s wholesale market participation where the resource would have been 
technically capable of providing such services without introducing reliability issue to the 
electric system.  
Identifying this source of participation barriers for ESR’s, the Final Rule includes a third 
required element for the ESR participation models: inclusion of market bidding 
parameters reflecting the physical and operational characteristics of ESR’s.  As outlined 
in Table 2-2, thirteen bidding parameters related to ESR charge states and ramping, 
operational durations, and service procurement efficiency were defined for inclusion in 
the ESR participation models (FERC, 2018)22.  ESR’s would be permitted to submit 
bidding parameters in both the day-ahead and real-time markets, along with the ability 
to update parameter values needed by RTO/ISO’s to find accurate dispatch solutions 
(FERC, 2018)23. 
The Final Rule does provide a great degree of flexibility to RTO/ISO’s to ensure that the 
physical and operational characteristics of ESR’s are accounted for, having recognized 
that unique market designs may enable alternate effective ways of executing this 
accounting (FERC, 2018)24.  RTO/ISO’s are also allowed discretion to determine 
whether submission of any information for specific bidding parameters is obligatory.   
                                                          
22 At Paragraphs 178-231 
23 At Paragraph 189 
24 At Paragraph 187 
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Table 2-2: Overview of Required ESR Bidding Parameters 
(FERC, 2018) 
 
  
Bidding 
Parameter 
Category 
Physical/Operational 
Characteristic 
Parameter Definition Parameter Functions and Details 
Charge States 
and Rates 
State of Charge Amount of energy stored in proportion to 
the limit on the amount of energy that can 
be stored, typically expressed as a 
percentage.  It represents the forecasted 
starting State of Charge for the market 
interval being offered into. 
• Reflects actual operating conditions 
of resource 
• Provides greater certainty to 
RTO/ISO on ESR capability 
• Telemetered in real time 
• ESR owner may elect self-
management (default) or RTO/ISO 
management 
Maximum State of 
Charge 
State of Charge value that should not be 
exceeded (i.e., gone above) when an ESR 
is receiving electric energy from the grid 
• Places limits on extent RTO/ISO 
can charge/discharge ESR 
• Ensures operation within design 
limits 
• Provision of static or dynamic 
values should be allowed 
Minimum State of 
Charge 
State of Charge value that should not be 
exceeded (i.e., gone below) when an ESR 
is injecting electric energy onto the grid 
Maximum Charge Limit Maximum MW quantity of electric energy 
that an ESR can receive from the grid 
• Similar to traditional economic 
maximum (highest output available 
for economic dispatch) 
Maximum Discharge 
Limit 
Maximum MW quantity of electric energy 
that an ESR can inject onto the grid 
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Table 2-2: Overview of Required ESR Bidding Parameters (cont’d) 
(FERC, 2018) 
Bidding 
Parameter 
Category 
Physical/Operational 
Characteristic 
Parameter Definition Parameter Functions and Details 
Operational 
Durations 
Minimum Charge Time Shortest duration that an ESR is able to be 
dispatched to receive electric energy from 
the grid 
• Potentially more applicable to 
resources with slow transition 
speeds 
• Similar to traditional Minimum Run 
Time, but reflects ESR withdrawal 
duration 
Maximum Charge Time Maximum duration that an ESR is able to 
be dispatched to receive electric energy 
from the grid 
• Prevents charging dispatch 
exceeding Maximum State of 
Charge (self-managed State of 
Charge) 
• Provides info on reliable withdrawal 
duration (self-managed State of 
Charge) 
Minimum Run Time Minimum amount of time that an ESR is 
able to inject electric energy to the grid 
• Prevents ESR wear and tear due to 
frequent start/stop 
• Ensures start-up costs are 
recoverable 
• Similar to traditional Minimum Run 
Time 
Maximum Run Time Maximum amount of time that an ESR is 
able to inject electric energy to the grid 
• Maximum discharge time due to 
physical, operational or contractual 
constraints  
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Table 2-2: Overview of Required ESR Bidding Parameters (cont’d) 
(FERC, 2018) 
Bidding 
Parameter 
Category 
Physical/Operational 
Characteristic 
Parameter Definition Notes 
Improved 
Service 
Procurement 
Efficiency 
Minimum Discharge 
Limit 
Minimum MW output level that an ESR can 
inject onto the grid 
• Limits may result from physical 
constraints/power electronics 
Minimum Charge Limit Minimum MW level that an ESR can 
receive from the grid 
Discharge Ramp Rate Speed at which an ESR can move from 
zero output to its Maximum Discharge Limit 
• Reflects possible difference in rates 
to achieving Maximum 
Discharge/Charge Limits 
• Similar to traditional Ramp Rate 
Charge Ramp Rate Speed at which an ESR can move from 
zero output to its Minimum Charge Limit 
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The parameters were designed for a wide range of storage resource characteristics, 
some of which might not be applicable to specific storage technologies and 
configurations (FERC, 2018)25, State of Charge oversight (see below) or ESR 
commercial obligations (FERC, 2018)26. 
State of Charge Management 
Requirements related to the management of an ESR’s state of charge and, by 
extension, the values of the related bidding parameters, are also included in the Final 
Rule.  Specifically, ESR owners must be allowed to self-manage the state of charge of 
their respective resources (FERC, 2018)27.  RTO/ISO’s are still permitted to have 
mechanisms to manage ESR state of charge, but election for such management must 
remain optional and require ESR owner opt-in (e.g., self-management is the default 
operational state). 
Self-management is advantageous for a variety of reasons, but it also comes with 
increased performance accountability for the ESR owners and operators.  Owner, 
presumably having best understanding of the long-term operation and instantaneous 
state of their storage resource, may be able to better optimize resource operation than 
RTO/ISO’s, especially when providing a variety of service types.  Self-management may 
also reduce wear and tear on the ESR through better attention to critical operational 
limits (FERC, 2018)28.  For example, violation of ESR Minimum and Maximum States of 
Charge levels can lead to significantly shortened resource lifetime or lead to hazardous 
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26 At Paragraph 207 
27 At Paragraph 246 
28 At Paragraph 247 
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operating conditions for some storage technologies.  Real time telemetry may mitigate 
some of this risk in the case of RTO/ISO state of charge management, but operators 
still carry some residual risk of sub-optimal resource operation due to telemetry failures 
or inaccuracies. 
Some advantages can be had from RTO/ISO management of ESR state of charge.  
ESR owners are fully accountable for not meeting performance requirements when self-
managing, and are subject to performance-based penalties when not meeting dispatch 
schedules (FERC, 2018)29; RTO/ISO management of state of charge exempts the ESR 
owner from these potential penalties.  Additionally, since resource owner have a greater 
capability to intentionally manipulate market conditions through physical or economic 
withholding when self-managing state of charge, market monitoring scrutiny may be 
expected to be commensurately greater (FERC, 2018)30.  RTO/ISO management could 
relieve some of this monitoring pressure.  Lastly, RTO/ISO state of charge management 
could actually improve the ability of ESR’s to provide select services (e.g., frequency 
regulation) due to unique technical requirements of those services (FERC, 2018)31.  
2.2.4 Minimum Size Requirements 
As the commercialization of newer storage technologies advances, the US electric 
system has seen the scale of proposals for such storage resources approaching that of 
traditional generation resources.  For example, Pacific Gas & Electric recently received 
approval from the CPUC for two battery storage projects, one for 180 MW and a second 
                                                          
29 At Paragraph 246 
30 At Paragraph 252 
31 At Paragraph 246 
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at 300 MW, to replace retiring gas generators (CPUC, 2018).  However, as shown in 
Figure 2-1, most storage resources operational in the US starting after 2000 have 
nameplate capacities ranging from less than 1 MW up to approximately 20 MW (EIA, 
2017b), which are significantly smaller than that of other electric system resources.   
Most existing participation models include minimum size requirements, but those were 
implemented prior to the emergence of smaller scale technologies utilized for storage 
resources (FERC, 2018)32.  Use of existing minimum size requirements would therefore 
prevent most storage resources from participating in wholesale markets.  In an effort to 
remove the source of barriers to ESR participation, the Final Rule provided a fourth 
required element for the participation model, stipulating a minimum resource size for 
ESR’s using the associated participation model. 
A minimum resource size of 100 kW is mandated for the ESR model, and is to be 
utilized for all capacity requirements and minimum energy injection/withdrawal bidding 
quantities (FERC, 2018)33.  This limit represents a balancing of two considerations.  
First, the Commission has acknowledged the challenges faced by RTO/ISO’s with 
determining dispatch solutions as the allowed resource size decreases (FERC, 2018)34.  
At the same time, all RTO/ISO’s have demonstrated the ability to accommodate 
resources small resource capacities; each has at least one existing participation model 
allowing resources as small as 100 kW (FERC, 2018)35. 
                                                          
32 At Paragraph 266 
33 At Paragraph 265 
34 At Paragraph 266 
35 At Paragraph 267 
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Figure 2-1: Newly Operational Energy Storage Generators (2000 – 2018) 
Note: Each bar represents the nameplate capacity of a single operating generator using storage-based 
technology listed in (EIA, 2017b).  Generators using storage-based technology include Batteries, 
Flywheels, Hydroelectric Pumped Storage, and Solar Thermal with Energy Storage. 
2.3 Energy for ESR Charging 
Storage resources have multiple options for obtaining energy for charging.  Storage 
resources coupled with on-site generation (e.g., solar-plus-storage projects) can be 
charged directly from generation in excess of on-site demand.  Alternatively, charging 
can occur with energy purchased from the grid.  Stored energy providing end-use 
services to the resource owner would be procured via retail transactions, and are clearly 
outside the Commission’s scope (See Chapter 3).  Energy purchased from the grid for 
charging, where the stored energy will later be injected back to the grid for resale, would 
occur via a wholesale transaction.  The characterization of such purchases as occurring 
115 of 133 (~86%) of 
New Operating 
Storage ≤ 20 MW 
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through wholesale markets had been established over 20 years prior to the issue date 
of Order No. 841 in the case of pumped air storage facilities (FERC, 1995).  The 
Commission found that this characterization was now broadly applicable to energy 
purchased to charge ESR’s injecting energy back to the grid for later resale (FERC, 
2018)36.   
The prices of energy purchased for later resale consist of multiple standard 
components, including the incremental cost of the energy, transmission constraints 
present at the point of purchase and transmission losses.  Thus, the wholesale prices 
charged to conventional loads can vary significantly depending on the load’s location on 
the grid and the transmission constraints experienced at that location (ISO-NE, 2019a).  
This composite price is referred to as a wholesale locational marginal price (LMP), and 
is the wholesale energy price paid by conventional loads.  The wholesale LMP can 
reflect either the specific location, or node, at which the location is connected to the grid 
(i.e., nodal LMP), or across a zone representing an aggregation of pricing nodes (i.e., 
zonal LMP). 
Accordingly, the Final Rule requires that ESR’s be charged the wholesale LMP, 
specifically the nodal LMP (FERC, 2018)37, for such whole energy purchases, just as 
any other load would be charged when purchasing energy for later resale.  While the 
energy price requirement is applicable to storage resources using the ESR participation 
model, the Final Rule clearly indicates the ability of storage resources to be charged the 
wholesale LMP is not derived from the use of any specific participation model; 
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applicability of wholesale LMP’s arises solely from the wholesale nature of the 
transaction (FERC, 2018)38.  Therefore, a resource meeting the Final Rule’s definition of 
an ESR is entitled to purchase energy for later resale at the wholesale LMP, regardless 
of whether it is using the ESR participation model required by The Final Rule, or some 
other participation model.  Additionally, this requirement to allow purchase of charging 
energy at the wholesale LMP applies to ESR’s interconnected at all levels of the electric 
system, (i.e., transmission-, distribution and behind-the-meter-connections). 
As detailed above, energy used for ESR’s charging can come from a variety of sources 
and be applied to different uses (e.g., retail vs. wholesale activities).  The Commission 
finds it critical that RTO/ISO’s be able to reliably differentiate between and account for 
these activities to ensure wholesale energy sales for ESR charging occur at the 
wholesale LMP.  As such, the Final Rule requires some form of direct metering of 
ESR’s, or other comparable means of enabling proper accounting of wholesale energy 
purchases of ESR charging, to ensure proper application of wholesale LMP charges 
(FERC, 2018)39.  It is recognized that this requirement may be difficult to address, and 
may require close coordination with distribution utilities and regulatory bodies 
possessing jurisdiction over the distribution portions of the electric grid (FERC, 2018)40. 
Related to wholesale energy purchases and withdrawals, the Final Rule seeks to further 
provide equivalent treatment of ESR’s and more traditional electric system elements.  
The issue of transmission charges is specifically addressed for the two scenarios where 
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ESR’s purchase energy for later resale.  First, ESR wholesale energy purchases 
intended for simply charging and later resale are identical in nature to load-related 
withdrawals executed by load-serving entities (LSE) (FERC, 2018)41.  Given this 
identical nature, ESR’s are thus deemed to have an identical liability for related 
transmission charges imposed on LSE’s.  Second, when dispatched to provide services 
requiring energy withdrawal from the grid (e.g. ancillary services), ESR’s would not be 
responsible for paying transmission charges; this treatment is consistent with that of 
traditional generators providing ancillary services (FERC, 2018)42. 
2.4 Key Out-of-Scope Topics 
Throughout the process leading up to issuance of the Final Rule, a variety of topics 
were within the scope of consideration, but were ultimately identified as being out of 
scope of this Final Rule (FERC, 2018)43.  These topics arose either through proposals 
made by FERC or through stakeholder comments submitted in response to the 
associated NOPR and the proposed form of the Final Rule.  This list of topics explicitly 
deemed out of scope of the Final Rule is quite long, consisting of over 20 various items.  
Comprehensive review of each topic may be of limited value when assessing their 
general impact on removal of barriers to ESR participation in the US electric system.  
However, three topics are worth a brief consideration due to their more obvious impacts 
on participation barriers for storage resources.  These include: (1) rules for aggregated 
demand response participation in wholesale electric markets, (2) expansion of ESR 
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participation models to wholesale markets outside of the organized markets managed 
by the RTO/ISO’s, and (3) incorporation of ESR’s into transmission planning activities. 
As indicated in Section 1.3 (Footnote 5), the 2016 NOPR initially sought comments on 
wholesale market participation rules for both electric storage resources and aggregated 
distributed energy resources (DER), but further action on aggregated DER was split off 
into a separate docket, RM-18-9-000, prior to issuance of the Final Rule (FERC, 
2018)44.  In the context of the Final Rule, any storage resource rated at less than 100 
kW would only be able to participate in wholesale electric markets through some form of 
aggregation mechanism allowing multiple storage resources to bid to inject or withdraw 
electric energy as part of wholesale transactions.   
Consideration of aggregated storage resources participation may not be a critical area 
needing immediate attention from FERC at the current time.  As shown in Table 2-3, 
small-scale storage projects reported to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (i.e., 
< 1 MW nameplate capacity) accounted for no more than 0.4% of all operational storage 
power capacity in the US in 2016 and 2017, the only years in which such data is 
available.  Storage capacity not eligible to participate in wholesale electric markets 
under the ESR participation models represents a subset of this capacity and would 
make up an even smaller percentage of existing US storage capacity.   
Yet future reductions in costs of storage technology amenable to systems with 
capacities lower than 100 kW or creation of effective subsidies for such resources could   
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Table 2-3: 2018 Electric Energy Served by RTO/ISO’s 
Large-Scale Storage Resources (≥ 1 MW) 
Year 
2016 
(EIA, 2016c) 
2017 
(EIA, 2017b) 
Technology 
Nameplate Capacity (MW) 
(EIA, 2016c) 
Nameplate Capacity (MW) 
(EIA, 2017b) 
Battery 545.2 707.8 
Flywheels 44.0 42.0 
Pumped Hydroelectric 21572.7 21643.3 
Natural Gas with 
Compressed Air 
Storage 110.0 110.0 
Solar Thermal with 
Energy Storage 405.0 405.0 
Large-Scale Battery 
Total 22676.9 22908.1 
Small-Scale Storage Resources (< 1 MW) 
Year 
2016 
(EIA, 2016a) 
2017 
(EIA, 2017a) 
Sector 
Non-Net Metered 
Nameplate 
Capacity (MW) 
Net Metered 
Nameplate 
Capacity (MW) 
Non-Net Metered 
Nameplate 
Capacity (MW) 
Net Metered 
Nameplate 
Capacity (MW) 
Residential 0.1 4.5 3.9 13.3 
Commercial 32.7 7.6 42.9 15.4 
Industrial 8.7 11.7 12.3 12.3 
Transportation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Direct Connection 1.2 N/A 1.4 N/A 
Small-Scale Battery 
Total a 66.5 101.5 
% Total Storage 
Nameplate Capacity b 0.3 0.4 
a. Sum of Non-Net Metered and Net Metered Nameplate Capacity 
b. Small-scale storage resources as a percentage of total storage (large- and small-scale) resources 
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change the urgency of this need.  To date, FERC organized a technical conference in 
April, 2018 to generally discuss potential effects of DER’s on bulk power systems, 
including considerations for future actions to address aggregated DER wholesale 
market participation.  As of March, 2019, no subsequent Commission actions or 
communications have been posted to docket RM-18-9-000 related to aggregated 
storage resource participation.   
A second deferred item, expansion of the Final Rule’s scope to storage resources not 
residing within RTO/ISO territories, was not further considered because the original 
NOPR was specifically limited to reforms of the structured wholesale markets 
coordinated by the RTO/ISO’s that fall within FERC’s jurisdiction45.  While retention of 
these scope boundaries in the Final Rule are understandable from a procedural view, 
from a practical perspective, removal of participation barriers for storage resources 
should be within FERC’s legislated authority and responsibility regardless of which 
national wholesale market a resource has access to.  The Commission’s rationale that 
existing market rules presenting barriers to storage resource participation lead to unjust 
and unreasonable, and therefore unlawful rates would seem to be equally valid 
regardless of whether one considers wholesale electric markets run by the RTO/ISO’s 
within FERC’s jurisdiction or other, more local entities. 
 
                                                          
45 ERCOT, a Regional Transmission Organization, is wholly contained within Texas, and is not 
synchronized with or interconnected with electric systems in other states.  All wholesale transactions 
occurring in ERCOT’s wholesale markets are intrastate sales, and are outside the authorized jurisdiction 
of FERC. 
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Table 2-4: 2018 Electric Energy Served by RTO/ISO’s 
Transmission 
System Operator/ 
Region 
2018 Annual 
Energy Served/ 
Generation 
(TWh) 
% of Total 
2018 Energy 
Generation 
Reference 2017 Large-
Scale Battery 
Power 
Capacity 
(MW)d 
% of Total 
2017 Large-
Scale Battery 
Power 
Capacity 
PJM Interconnection 807 21 (PJM, 2019) 278 39 
Midwest ISO (MISO) 684 18 (MISO, 2019) 21 3 
Southwest Power Pool 
(SPP) 
276 7 (ERCOT, 2019a) Not Reported N/A 
California ISO (CAISO) 239 6 
(PowerSouth Energy Cooperative, 
2019) 
130 18 
New York ISO (NYISO) 156a 4 (NYISO, 2018a) Not Reported N/A 
ISO New England 
(ISO-NE) 
142 4 (ISO-NE, 2019b) 23 3 
US 3802 100 (EIA, 2019a) 708 100 
Combined RTO/ISO 
Regionsb 
2304 61 N/A 452 64 
Other Regions 1498c 39 N/A 256 36 
a. 2018 baseline demand forecast 
b. ERCOT generation and large-scale battery power capacity included: ERCOT does not fall under FERC’s jurisdiction 
c. Value calculated as difference between total US and Combined RTO/ISO Region generation 
d. (EIA, 2018) Figure 2 
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The load not served by the six RTO/ISO’s within FERC’s jurisdiction represents a minor, 
but not insignificant portion of annual electricity sales to all end-use sectors (residential, 
commercial, industrial, transportation).  As shown in Table 2-4, 39% of the 2018 annual 
total US sales occurred outside of these six RTO/ISO-operated markets.  The large-
scale battery storage power capacity installed outside of territories served by RTO/ISO’s 
made up approximately 36% of all such capacity in 2017 (EIA, 2018).  Even if future 
growth trends in both annual energy sales and installed storage capacity are not 
comparable in regions served by RTO/ISO’s and those served by other entities, there 
will likely continue to be significant portions of the US wholesale electric markets without 
clearly applicable rules governing storage resource participation.  FERC will therefore 
continue to have opportunities requiring its intervention to ensure storage resources can 
contribute to the achievement of increased competition and ultimately just and 
reasonable electricity rates in all regions of the country. 
Finally, tasking RTO’s and ISO’s with including storage resources in transmission 
planning was not addressed in the NOPR, and as such, is not within scope of the 
proscriptions laid out in the Final Rule.  The RTO/ISO’s have ultimate responsibility for 
short-term reliability, long-term planning and expansion of the transmission system 
(FERC, 1996, 2000).  With a relatively low penetration of storage resources at the 
various interconnection levels in the current electric system, risks originating from 
increased utilization of transmission services by storage resources is likely to be 
minimal at the present time.  Inclusion of ESR’s in transmission planning considerations 
may not currently be critical to maintaining transmission system reliability.  Neither is it 
clear that such consideration may present barriers to storage resource participation. 
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Inclusion of storage resources in transmission planning can reasonably be expected to 
become more critical as larger, non-PHES storage resources become approved (see 
above, Section 2.2.4), presumably interconnected at the transmission-level.  More 
challenging may be the need to closely coordinate transmission planning with 
distribution- and BTM-level needs if increasing numbers of storage resources located at 
those interconnection levels seek to participate in wholesale market transactions.  Such 
infrastructure planning will require close interactions between, at a minimum, federal 
and state-level regulatory agencies with jurisdiction over the planning of the relevant 
portions of the electric system. 
2.5 ESR Value Creation and Participation Model-Driven Storage Capacity 
Deployment 
The Final Rule does not include any targeted level of ESR deployment.  It simply seeks 
to increase competition in wholesale electricity markets and, ultimately, lower electricity 
rates.  Increased participation of ESR’s within the scope considered in the Final Rule, is 
viewed simply as a means to achieving these lower rates.  Such an arguably narrow 
statement of focus should not be surprising; as discussed in Chapter 3, ensuring just 
and reasonable rates (i.e., lower rates achieved through increased competition) is the 
foundation upon which the Commission’s authorized jurisdiction rests to require creation 
of the new participation models. 
Regardless of the Order’s stated focus, as new opportunities for ESR’s to provide grid-
related services are realized through the new participation models, there should be 
greater prospects for ESR to generate increasing value for a broad range of 
stakeholders.  Depending on the nature and size of this created value, increased ESR 
39 | P a g e  
 
participation will lead to commensurate increases in available storage capacity, all other 
things considered equal (i.e., resource costs). Assessing the value creation provide by 
use of the ESR participation models can offer insight into how the US energy storage 
capacity may change upon implementation of the models and identification of additional 
barriers to the development of greater storage resource capacity. 
Electric storage resources are not unique in their ability to provide multiple types of 
services to the grid; generation resources have long provided energy, capacity and 
ancillary services.  However, as the rate of renewable energy resources penetration has 
increased, so too has the appreciation of the uniquely broad range of services that 
electricity storage technologies can provide.  In a meta-analysis of previous studies, 
Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI) provided a framework of 13 services, categorizing 
according to the stakeholders reaping the greatest benefits from a given service type 
(Fitzgerald, Mandel, Morris, & Touatl, 2015).  These categories included RTO/ISO 
services, utility services and customer services.  Several studies performed by the 
Brattle Group over the past few years identified a similar, but not identical, range of 
benefits that energy storage was capable of providing (Chang et al., 2015).  In this case, 
the authors utilized a categorization based on parties through which the benefits would 
be measured, as summarized in Table 2-5. 
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Table 2-5: Electric Storage Resource Value Categorization  
(Chang et al., 2015) 
Value Category Category Description 
Merchant Value Net profits that a private investor could monetize by 
participating in wholesale markets 
System-Wide/ 
Societal Benefits 
Overall benefits of storage to the electric system as a whole, 
regardless of whether those benefits and costs accrue to the 
asset owner, retail customers, market participants or other 
entities 
Customer Benefits Benefits that accrue directly to electricity users 
 
Figure 2-2 provides a graphical comparison of these two models, delineating the value 
categorizations, associated value types common between the two categorization 
schemes, and value types unique to each categorization.  Some differentiation between 
any energy storage valuation frameworks can be expected.  As the electric grid 
continues to evolve, innovative uses of electric storage resources may be realized as 
new grid needs also materialize.  In a related fashion, newer valuation studies may 
ignore previously assessed value types that have been demonstrated to be relatively 
insignificant.  Also, some valuation studies may elect to emphasize or exclude specific 
electric storage benefits based on the intended study goals or the methodological 
difficulties introduced by specific value types. 
Both categorization schemes can be used to assess the impact of the ESR participation 
models on the service value provided by storage resources and how that value is 
received by different grid participants and stakeholders.  However, the value 
categorization utilized by the Brattle group provides a more intuitive structure for 
assessing the impact of new resource participation models to the electric system.  First, 
the Brattle model’s focus on merchant value (i.e., net profits obtainable by resource  
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Figure 2-2: Two Models for Energy Storage Value Categorization 
(Chang et al., 2015; Fitzgerald et al., 2015) 
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owners) places a clear emphasis on the stakeholders directly responsible for developing 
and owning new electric storage resources, as well as the economic signals needed to 
achieve market equilibrium-levels of storage resources.  RMI’s alternate focus on 
RTO’s/ISO’s provides a more indirect assessment, given the absence of storage 
resource ownership by these organizations.  Second, the Brattle group’s broader 
definition of system-wide benefits is agnostic with respect to which stakeholder group 
should ultimately benefit from storage-derived values that are external to those enjoyed 
by resource owners; RMI’s categorization implies exclusive enjoyment of these benefits 
by utilities.  The treatment of customer benefits is comparable between the two 
categorization models.  Elements of the ESR participation models have not yet been 
generally implemented, with the exception being for those RTO’s/ISO’s proposing to 
leverage existing wholesale market structures to meet the requirements in the Final 
Rule, as discussed further in Chapter 4.  Thus, there have not been detailed quantitative 
studies undertaken to predict the impact of the ESR various participation models on 
either the realizable benefits at the merchant, system or customer levels, or the levels of 
storage capacity. 
Nonetheless, studies have been performed that can illustrate useful insights about 
storage resource benefits relevant to the new ESR participation models.  One study by 
the Brattle group investigated the value of distributed storage resources in the 
transmission region operated by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) 
(Chang et al., 2015).  The study attempted to predict the economic viability of varying 
storage deployment levels capable of meeting the peak load increases forecasted for 
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2020.  Scenarios ranging from 1000 – 8000 MW of deployed storage capacity were 
investigated. 
The merchant value was observed to increase along with storage deployment level 
(Figure 2-3).  Despite these increasing total net profits for the storage resource owners, 
decreasing profit margins were forecast for higher storage deployment levels due 
primarily to saturation of the ancillary services market (Figure 2-4) by the added storage  
resources.  This source of declining merchant value with increased storage deployment 
may not be unique to the ERCOT region, but could also be experienced in regions 
where the sizes of ancillary services markets are significantly smaller than the 
respective energy markets46. 
In ERCOT region, merchant values alone were to forecasted to be sufficient to justify 
the costs of only the lowest levels of storage deployment considered.  Several cost 
estimates were utilized, reflecting: (1) expected and high battery cost with different fixed 
operations and maintenance costs, and (2) different discount rates (i.e., after-tax 
weighted-average cost of capital (ATWACC) to simulate financing available to larger 
utility owners (lower ATWACC) and smaller merchant owners (higher ATWACC).  As 
shown in Figure 2-3, with smaller merchants as the primary source of storage 
deployment, only 1000 MW of new storage capacity would be justified based on 
merchants recouping storage value from energy and ancillary service market net profits 
only, assuming they were able to achieve the expected battery and installation costs of 
                                                          
46 As an example, ISO-NE’s 2017 ancillary services costs ($128.3 million) were less than 3% of that from 
the energy markets ($4.5 billion) (ISO-NE, 2018a). 
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Figure 2-3: 2020 Forecasted Merchant Value and Storage Costs 
(From Figure 17, (Chang et al., 2015)) 
 
 
Figure 2-4: 2020 Annual Net Revenues for Storage 
(From Figure 6, (Chang et al., 2015)) 
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$350/kWh.  Even with their lower financing costs, larger utility owners would still need to 
achieve the lower battery costs of $350/kWh in order for the somewhat higher 
deployment of 3000 MW to be financially viable. 
Greater levels of storage deployment may become economically feasible if there is 
mechanism to provide at least some of the other value provided by the other two 
categories (system-wide and customer benefits).  The Brattle group study of ERCOT 
region predicts that as much as 8000 MW of storage would be economically feasible 
based on currently expected 2020 battery costs (Figure 2-5).  This assessment only 
considered large utilities with lower ATWACC in estimating prices, so inclusion of finite 
levels of smaller merchant ownership could be expected to again result in somewhat 
lower storage deployment.  Regardless, one can still notice a pattern of declining 
marginal system-wide benefits with increasing storage deployment, similar to that 
observed when assessing merchant value.  While there are no apparent decreases in 
any of the system-wide value types with increasing storage deployment, the growth of 
some components (e.g., avoided capacity investments) clearly do not keep up with the 
increased deployment costs. 
With its focus on providing greater opportunities for storage resource participation, the 
ESR participation models required by the Final Rule will have a direct impact on 
merchant value.  However, the participation model requirements lack any of the 
mechanisms needed to ensure that storage resource owners capture some of the 
system-wide benefits that could encourage the needed levels of investment for higher 
storage deployment levels.  System-wide benefits are, by definition, more disperse and 
involve a greater number of stakeholders relative to merchant value.  Therefore, it may  
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Figure 2-5: 2020 Annual Net Revenues for Storage 
(From Figure 18, (Chang et al., 2015)) 
be a significantly greater challenge for FERC to expand upon its efforts, as started in 
this Final Rule, to further broaden energy storage participation in wholesale markets.  
The system-wide benefits may also involve planning for electric system components 
that are outside the scope of FERC’s authority (e.g., generation and distribution 
planning).  Such efforts will require close collaboration between the Commission and 
state-level regulatory entities.   
2.6 Conclusions 
The Final Rule issued in Order No. 841 by FERC outlines four principal requirements for 
a participation model for electric storage resources to be implemented by the various 
RTO’s and ISO’s.  Resources that are qualified to meet the requirements of the 
associated new resource, the Electric Storage Resource, are eligible to provide all 
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energy-related services in wholesale markets that they are technically capable of 
providing.  The ESR participation models will be required to allow qualifying storage 
resources to be dispatched as a buyer and seller of energy market services.  Resources 
utilizing the ESR participation will thus be eligible to set market clearing prices, 
regardless of whether submitted wholesale bids are for energy withdrawal, injection or 
both, in the case where the ESR is the marginal resource for a given market interval.  
To facilitate the ability to provide supply offers and demand bids in a fashion that does 
not impede wholesale market participation, the Final Rule provides a range of thirteen 
required bid parameters as part of the ESR participation model while providing 
RTO/ISO’s with great flexibility on incorporation of these parameters into existing 
bidding systems.  Additionally, the Final Rule proscribes that any storage resource be 
charged at the wholesale LMP when purchasing energy for storage that will later be 
reinjected to the grid for resale.   
The Final Rule does indeed provide a framework to address issues related to storage 
resource participation in wholesale markets.  However, as with any other regulatory 
effort, Order No. 841 can’t reasonably be expected to address all outstanding issues on 
a topic as complex as energy storage, nor can it anticipate all future challenges 
associated with storage.  Several issues were identified as out of scope of the Final 
Rule, but may become more critical as an increasing range of storage resources seek to 
participate in wholesale electric markets in the future: aggregated demand response 
participation, storage resource participation outside RTO/ISO territory, and careful 
coordination of transmission planning. 
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Finally, the current focus on using participation models to increase wholesale market 
competition is a mechanism by which FERC has significant experience using.  
However, this approach primarily addresses realization of merchant value, which may 
be insufficient to achieve optimal levels of storage resource deployment even as 
storage costs continue to decrease.  The Commission will need to address how system-
wide benefits are produced and consider mechanisms to leverage these benefits to 
provide more comprehensive market signals that energy storage owners need to aid in 
deploying economically-optimal storage capacity levels.
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Chapter 3 Legal Foundations and Jurisdictional Perspectives on ESR 
Regulation 
3.1 Introduction 
Just as with any other market structure, the US electricity market is not a static 
construct; even since restructuring away from the then-dominant vertically integrated 
utility models began in 1980’s (Lazar, 2016), it has continued to evolve.  Indeed, upon 
upcoming implementation of the tariff revisions defining the electric storage resource 
(ESR) participation models, Order No. 841 (FERC, 2018) itself will be one of the latest 
regulatory-driven changes occurring within US electricity markets. 
The market structure, and the regulatory regime defining aspects of that structure, 
provides the mechanism (e.g., pricing signals) by which ESR service values are 
identified and the extent to which compensation is provided.  In working towards 
creation of Order No. 841, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has 
sought to create sustainable regulatory and market mechanisms needed to increase 
ESR participation beyond current levels.   
Uncertainty around how an ESR can participate in US electricity markets may serve as 
an impediment to the realization of economically-optimal development, implementation 
and utilization of these resources.  Since development and financing of ESR’s involve 
making long-term decisions, rapid changes in this nascent regulatory regime could 
result in many ESR’s becoming stranded assets.  Additionally, regulatory uncertainty 
could conceivably lead to the long-term suppression of appetite for further investment in 
innovation of a resource that could greatly facilitate transition to a lower-carbon-
emission national energy system. 
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An assessment of the ability of the requirements embodied in Order No. 841 to 
withstand judicial challenge can help inform the likelihood of the durability of the Order-
driven participation models and the sustainability of the non-discriminatory environment 
for ESR’s potential roles in the national electricity system.  This assessment will include: 
(1) a brief overview of FERC’s traditional jurisdiction over interstate wholesale electricity 
sales, (2) a summary of FERC’s authorization and jurisdictional claims relevant to the 
Order, (3) discussion of vulnerabilities to judicial review by FERC’s recent execution of 
that jurisdiction in Order No. 841 and (4) challenges arising from that jurisdictional 
execution. 
3.2 FERC Jurisdiction over Interstate Wholesale Electricity Sales 
An understanding of the derivation of FERC’s currently exercised jurisdiction in 
electricity markets, along with the dual regulatory system established with the States, 
will illuminate subsequent discussions on the resilience that Order No. 841 may expect 
as the ISO’s and RTO’s begin implementation of their ESR participation models.  Key to 
this understanding includes detailing Congress’ driver for implementing regulation of 
electricity markets, the primary objectives of this regulation, and delineation of federal 
and state jurisdiction over wholesale electricity markets. 
The need for Congressional action to regulate wholesale electricity sales became 
evident through the US Supreme Court’s decision in Public Utilities Commission of 
Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co. (Public Util. Comm. V. Attleboro Co., 
1927).  The case resulted from the Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island 
implementing price schedules for electricity purchases made by an out-of-state 
company (Attleboro Steam & Electric Company) from an in-state generator 
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(Narragansett Electric Lighting Company). The decision identified these sales as 
“national in character” (i.e., not local matters subject to jurisdiction of a single State).  
Accordingly, the Court indicated that only Congress has the power to enact regulations 
impacting such interstate commerce for electric power. 
Congress ultimately did respond, enacting Part II (Regulation of Electric Utility 
Companies Engaged in Interstate Commerce) of the Federal Power Act (FPA) in 1935 
(Federal Power Act, 1935).  This addition to the FPA has since served as the 
overarching US statute governing regulation of electricity sales, transmission, 
distribution and generation.  The integral statutory role assigned to FERC (and its 
predecessor group, the Federal Power Commission) is ensuring that all rates and 
charges for electricity sales within its jurisdiction, as well as rates and regulations 
impacting those sales, are “just, reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or 
preferential” (FERC, 2011a). 
The FPA created a concurrent regulatory scheme where, not only are the federal 
jurisdictional bounds outlined, but explicit carve-outs for interdependent State 
jurisdiction not subject to preemption are provided (Dennis, Kelly, Nordhaus, & Smith, 
2016; Lindh, 2013; Nordhaus, 2015).  The specific aspects of federal jurisdiction 
captured in the FPA include electricity transmission and wholesale electricity sales 
when either occur as part of interstate commerce.  The delineated State jurisdiction 
encompasses four areas: (1) electricity sales other than those within federal jurisdiction 
(i.e., sale at wholesale in interstate commerce), (2) generation or local distribution 
facilities, (3) facilities used for intra-state commerce, and (4) transmission facilities for 
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electricity consumed wholly by the transmission facility owner (Federal Power Act, 
1935). 
The execution of this collaborative structure was greatly influenced by the US Supreme 
Court findings in Federal Power Commission v. Southern California Edison Co. (Federal 
Power Commission v. Southern Cal. Edison, 1964).  In this case, the Court assessed 
whether the jurisdiction previously exercised by the CPUC over the rates charged to the 
City of Colton (CA) for energy generated at the Hoover Dam was preempted by the 
Dormant Commerce Clause of the US Constitution.  The Court found that these 
interstate wholesale electricity sales were not exempt from federal jurisdiction, 
preempting the CPUC’s jurisdiction.  The decision went further by rejecting the need for 
case-by-case assessment of the federal jurisdictional scope under the FPA and that 
jurisdiction’s impact on state regulation.  This perspective was derived from the 
Congress’ establishment of a “bright line easily ascertained” between state and federal 
jurisdiction as they relate to interstate wholesale electricity sales. 
Taken together with the dual regulatory structure in Part II of the FPA and the Federal 
Power Commission v. Southern California Edison Co. decision, an operational 
understanding of state and federal jurisdictional authorization took shape for electricity 
sales.  In the execution of this bright line, federal jurisdiction would preempt State 
statues and regulation in the case of interstate wholesale sales; the only exceptions 
would involve those clearly derived from the State carve-outs explicitly captured in the 
FPA or other applicable federal statutes (Lindh, 2013). 
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3.3 FERC’s Authorization and Jurisdictional Claims in Order No. 841 
As with other federal regulatory agencies, FERC exercises the authority conferred upon 
it by Congress, with the FPA serving as a key document defining the limits of that 
authority (California Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 2004).  To ensure its actions 
are lawful and within its statutorily-defined jurisdiction, FERC’s regulations and actions 
are subject to judicial review (Administrative Procedure Act, 1946).  Thus, a lack of care 
by FERC in documenting the statutory authority under which it is executing new 
regulations, such as with the present case in Order No. 841, could lead to the 
realization of significant regulatory risk and poor electricity market function. 
Within the Order, there are two key matters discussed related to FERC’s authority and 
its associated jurisdiction (FERC, 2018).  First, FERC outlined a general consideration 
of whether it is authorized to enact regulations impacting resources that can be qualified 
as ESR’s.  Generally, the Commission viewed current market rules and available 
participation models as effectively introducing barriers to competition.  As a result, the 
status quo for ESR participation in wholesale electricity markets was viewed as unjust 
and unreasonable; Order No. 841 is thus intended to serve as a needed mechanism to 
mitigate what FERC considers an unlawful state of a type defined by the FPA. 
Central to FERC’s assessment is the realization that technology used in the electricity 
system has not remained static, and as in the case of electricity storage, continued 
evolution can be expected.  Regardless of specific technologies utilized, new resources 
are likely to have technical capabilities different from those envisioned when existing 
wholesale market rules were enacted by ISO’s and RTO’s (Gonzále, 2016).  So, while 
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an ESR may not be fully excluded from participating in wholesale markets, it may also 
not be able to provide all services that it is technically capable of due to limitations 
imposed by rules likely designed for traditional electrical system resources or specific 
technologies.  These barriers to full ESR participation, even if not intended when 
applicable market rules were designed, are now viewed as a source of restriction on 
market competition and a commensurate failure to ensure just and reasonable 
wholesale rates (FERC, 2018). 
A second key jurisdictional matter in the Order arose as part of the Commission’s 
determination on the definition of an ESR.  The original definition proposed in the Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) characterized an ESR as “a resource capable of 
receiving electric energy from the grid and storing it for later injection of electric energy 
back to the grid regardless of where the resource is located on the electrical system” 
(FERC, 2016).  The Final Rule did not ultimately include any qualification of the ESR 
location, but provided clarification that system location does not establish applicability of 
the ESR definition.  Specifically, resources meeting the definition would not be limited to 
those interconnected to the interstate transmission system (i.e., the location of activities 
typically in scope of FERC jurisdiction); distribution-level and behind-the-meter (BTM) 
resources could also qualify as ESR’s and come under federal jurisdiction (FERC, 
2018) when seeking to participate in wholesale market activities. 
This broad resource definition was indeed viewed positively by a number of 
commenters on the NOPR.  Perceived benefits of this approach include providing 
market access to energy exported by BTM storage resources (Comments of the Energy 
Storage Association (Docket Nos. RM16-23-000; AD16-20-000; Order No. 841), 2017) 
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and removal of barriers preventing BTM resources from providing both retail and 
wholesale services (Comments of Advanced Microgrid Solutions, Inc. (Docket Nos. 
RM16-23-000; AD16-20-000; Order No. 841), 2017). 
3.4 FERC Jurisdictional Execution and Order 841 
3.4.1 Vulnerability to Judicial Review 
If ESR’s had capabilities that limited the resources to direct participation in only 
wholesale sales, or if they were only interconnected at the transmission level, FERC’s 
claimed authority outlined for these resources would not be controversial.  For example, 
PHES has provided energy storage services in the US since the 1930’s (Yang & 
Jackson, 2011), and, as recently as the March, 2018, provided ~94% of all electricity 
storage capacity in the US (2018).  When much of the existing PHES capacity was built 
in the US in the 1960’s and 1970’s, the value of this storage resource was largely based 
on economic comparisons to fossil fuel plants providing only utility-level energy and 
capacity (Denholm, Ela, Kirby, & Milligan, 2010).  The grid interface (i.e., transmission 
level) and electricity market participation for these storage resources were thus 
comparable to that of conventional generators.  Therefore, the traditional “bright line” 
between federal and state jurisdictional separation was generally suitable to provide 
clear, stable regulatory regimes under which long-term economic decisions on resource 
development and utilization could be made (Nordhaus, 2015).  
The rapid change represented by the wider range of available storage technologies, 
recognition of and need for the wider range of services available from ESR’s, and their 
attainment of critical levels of commercial maturity, prompted FERC to address barrier 
56 | P a g e  
 
to ESR participation in wholesale markets (FERC, 2016).  However, along with this 
diversity in services that ESR can provide, the grid and its applicable regulatory 
framework must now also contend with diversity in resource interconnection and market 
participation (Jacob, 2017).  As new technologies and practices arise that can have 
direct impact on both the wholesale and retail levels, the bright line jurisdictional test 
may fall short; an engrained recognition of the potential interrelationship between 
federal and state regulatory actions will be needed. 
Key among the challenges presented by the availability of these diverse services are 
questions regarding whether the FERC has inappropriately pre-empted state authority 
by establish regulations on distribution- and BTM-level electric system components.  A 
number of commenters to the 2016 NOPR took issue with potential jurisdictional 
implications of the proposed resource definition.  A consistent theme among the 
commenters was the extent to which the Order would impact established state and 
local-level jurisdiction.  Possible impacted areas include provision of retail and 
distribution-level services (APPA/NRECA, 2017) and distribution system design 
(DTE Energy, 2017; MISO Transmission Owners, 2017) 
Order No 841 is not the first instance where FERC has addressed wholesale market 
participation by sub-transmission-level resources.  Recently, FERC issued Order Nos. 
719 and 745, outlining demand response resource participation in wholesale markets 
(FERC, 2008b, 2011b).  Of particular relevance to this discussion, various commenters 
to those orders questioned FERC’s authority to set compensation for demand response 
resources in organized wholesale markets, declaring “that the issue of demand 
57 | P a g e  
 
response compensation is fundamentally intertwined with retail rates, ratepayer issues 
and state jurisdictional concerns” (FERC, 2011b)47.   
Order No. 745 provided an explicit rejection of these challenges to the Commission’s 
claimed authority.  The Commission had previously determined that demand response 
bids into wholesale markets have a direct impact on wholesale rates (FERC, 2008a)48.  
FERC thus claimed its authorization, citing its mandate provided by the FPA to ensure 
rates and charges for transmission or interstate wholesale sales are just and 
reasonable, especially when the respective activities are found to direct affect wholesale 
rates (FERC, 2011b)49 
The Electric Power Supply Association, a trade association representing various large 
energy producers and generators, was among several petitioners that requested a 
judicial review of FERC’s claimed authority regarding direct response resources.  Upon 
the ruling by the US District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to vacate the 
entirety of Order No. 745 (Electric Power Supply Association v. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 2015), FERC appealed the decision to the US Supreme Court.  
In the resulting ruling (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply 
Association, 2016), the US Supreme Court affirmed that FERC had operated within its 
authorized jurisdiction; Order No. 745 was indeed related to practices directly affecting 
wholesale rates.  Additionally, FERC could exercise this jurisdiction without impinging 
State authorities outlined in the FPA since no attempts were made to regulate retail 
sales involving demand response. 
                                                          
47 At Paragraph 103 
48 At Paragraph 47 
49 At Paragraph 112 
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Order No. 841 leverages the precedent set with demand response in Order Nos. 719 
and 745 as well as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power 
Supply Association decision to reiterate the Commission’s claim of exclusive jurisdiction 
over wholesale market participation, even for resources connected at the sub-
transmission level (FERC, 2018)50.  However, FERC’s efforts on ESR’s excluded one 
aspect that was part of the Orders on demand response; no allowance is made for 
relevant State-level regulatory bodies to prohibit ESR owners from making wholesale 
markets bids.  While generally discussed in the context of aggregated storage resource 
participation, commenters noted the value afforded by certain rule features (e.g., 
inclusion of a State-level opt out for allowing distribution-level of BTM resources from 
participating in wholesale markets) to the maintenance of State-level jurisdiction 
(DTE Energy, 2017; MISO Transmission Owners, 2017). 
The absence of such opt-outs in the Order may reinforce concerns regarding over-
expansive jurisdictional claims by FERC at the expense of those reserved for States by 
the FPA.  An initial avenue for challenges could originate from the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association decision the Order No. 
841 leverages as precedent.  Specifically, the decision cites Order No. 745’s allowance 
for “any State regulator to prohibit its consumers from making demand response bids in 
the wholesale market” as a demonstration of “FERC’s notable solicitude toward the 
States” (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association 
et al., 2016).  It is this recognition by FERC, derived from the interrelated nature of 
wholesale and retail markets especially relevant for sub-transmission-level resources, 
                                                          
50 At Paragraph 35 
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that served as the “finishing blow” to EPSA’s claims of federal intrusion on State-level 
jurisdiction.   
The Final Rule in Order No. 841 does recognize the variety of roles that states play in 
the implementation of electric storage resources, including design, operation and 
reliability of the distribution system, in addition to regulation of retail services (FERC, 
2018)51.  It also states the intention to not affect the responsibilities of distribution 
utilities, especially with respect to electric storage resource.  The need for such 
allowances may become more pressing as FERC works further on the aggregated ESR 
docket. 
3.4.2 Challenges Arising from FERC’s Jurisdictional Execution 
The nature of the electric grid and its associated components and practices will continue 
to evolve, presenting new jurisdictional challenges for FERC, state-level regulators, grid 
service suppliers and customers.  Electric storage and demand response are just two 
examples where the classical “bright line” that provided a clear interface between 
federal and state regulatory jurisdiction is no longer so obvious now that specific grid 
components can play significant roles in both wholesale and retail markets.  In both 
cases, the Commission staked out a seemingly broader implementation of its authorized 
jurisdiction at the expense the states’ jurisdiction by focusing on the direct impact to 
interstate wholesale sales by ESR and demand response participation.  The validity of 
the Commission’s approach to preempting State authority over all interstate wholesale 
sales was upheld for demand response with the Federal Energy Regulatory 
                                                          
51 At Paragraph 36 
60 | P a g e  
 
Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association ruling.  To date, no such cases have 
been brought involving Order No. 841 and energy storage; it may be too early to tell if or 
how Order No. 841 will be challenged for possible unlawful preemption of State powers 
authorized under Part II of the FPA. 
This increasing deference to federal jurisdiction at the expense of the states’ authority, 
even if it survives future judicial challenge, does not come without consequences.  For 
example, in its Orders on electric storage and demand response wholesale market 
participation, the Commission has continued to recognize earlier participation by such 
resources in specific states as a precursor to taking broader, national-level actions 
(FERC, 2018)52, (FERC, 2008b)53.  The states can thus effectively provide 
environments capable of delivering earlier introduction of technological and market 
innovations. It is unlikely that FERC could ever develop the detailed understanding of 
local-level grid aspects and stakeholder impacts, as well as gather the necessary 
resources, to match what the sum of the nation’s individual states could apply to such 
challenges.  The end result of this jurisdictional approach could inhibit the development 
and maturing of technological innovations that FERC is seeking to attain just and 
reasonable electricity rates through increased wholesale market competition.   
It should be noted that while FERC has taken a more exclusive interpretation of its 
jurisdiction when it perceives an action directly impacting interstate wholesale electricity 
prices, the Commission still acknowledges the “vital role of the states with respect to the 
development and operation of electric storage resources.” (FERC, 2018)54.  This 
                                                          
52 At Paragraph 11 
53 At Paragraph 18 
54 At Paragraph 36 
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perspective, voiced in establishing the requirements for the ESR participation model, 
mirrors the fundamentally intertwined nature of demand response jurisdictional issues 
previously expressed by the Commission (FERC, 2011b)55.  Such recognition may be a 
sign of FERC’s understanding the value of continued cooperative actions with its State-
level counterparts.  In the absence of focused actions undertaken to exploit benefits 
available from deeper, cooperative relationships with State regulatory bodies, it isn’t 
clear how successful or timely FERC will be in addressing this challenge56. 
Additionally, development of market design and practices applied on the national, or 
even the regional level managed by the individual RTO/ISO’s, without being informed of 
relevant needs at the state and local level risks can introduce unintended reliability 
concerns to the electric system.  For example, RTO/ISO’s have a mandated role in 
long-term transmission planning, whereas distribution planning is left to state and local 
regulatory bodies.  As described by De Martini et. al., (distribution and transmission 
system planning are foreseen to require an integrated approach for electric systems 
seeking high levels of distributed energy resources, including energy storage, while still 
maintaining acceptable reliability levels (De Martini & Kristov, 2015).  Thus, the 
transmission and distribution planning required to meet many of the state-level 
renewable energy policy goals, in addition to the concomitant increases in wholesale 
                                                          
55 At Paragraph 103 
56 FERC Order 719, footnote 79 mentions efforts between National Association of Regulatory 
Commissioners and the Commission to “outline options to coordinate retail and wholesale regulatory 
policies in order to stimulate demand response by reducing or eliminating jurisdictional barriers” (FERC, 
2008b).  Further research into the scope and impact of these efforts may better illuminate the value of 
FERC’s efforts to date to proactively address multi-jurisdictional issues faced by distributed energy 
resources (including ESR’s and demand response). 
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electric market competition sought by FERC, will likely require more than just an ever-
expanding deference to federal jurisdiction. 
Finally, any evolving regulatory regime will likely cause some level of uncertainty in 
stakeholders wishing to initiate or further expand provision of novel services, including 
those provided by ESR’s.  In the face of changing regulatory regimes, organizations 
must not simply contend with the ability of their current business model to create and 
capture value in earlier market conditions.  A business model’s ability “to remain 
feasible and viable in a changing business environment” (Haaker, Bouwman, Janssen, 
& De Reuver, 2017) becomes just as critical as understanding how the model 
fundamentally allows it to create and capture value (Bouwman H., 2008). 
The electricity sector, like other infrastructure sectors, are capital intensive, utilize long-
lived physical assets and are subject to significant regulation (Markard, 2011).  These 
features make the sector vulnerable to developing substantial levels of stranded assets 
if the underlying business models are not sufficiently robust.  The importance that 
regulations play in determining electricity sector business model viability has begun 
receiving greater attention, typically as part of studies investigating sector disruptions 
such as renewable energy transitions and introduction of market competition (Leisen, 
Steffen, & Weber, 2019).  Indeed, the nature of regulations and associated institutions 
are viewed as playing a key role in both renewable energy technology innovation 
(Markard, 2011) and deciding the degree of future renewable infrastructure 
centralization (Schmid, Knopf, & Pechan, 2016). 
A policy process effect, originating from uncertainty in initial business model viability and 
long-term resilience in the face of uncertainty in the speed and probability of regulatory 
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regime change, has been identified as a source of investments gaps (Garnier & 
Madlener, 2016).  For ESR’s, one such policy process impact can result from judicial 
review and subsequent rollback of novel aspects of the regulatory structure and 
participation model implementation created by Order No. 841.  The risk of such an 
occurrence has the potential to remove mid- or long-term market participation by a 
resource class that is still in an early innovative phase.  Mitigation of such risks could 
involve a number of undesirable outcomes: (1) chilling further investments in innovation 
that could reduce the cost and increase the capability of future types of ESR’s, (2) 
lowering levels of investment to implement mature ESR technologies for market 
participation (avoiding the risk of owning newly-stranded assets), and (3) need for 
additional incentives to maintain desired investment levels. 
3.5 Conclusions 
The unidirectional design of the early US electric grid provided for a reasonably clear 
delineation between electricity producers, suppliers and customers.  This demarcation 
allowed for a clear differentiation between parties to wholesale (inter- and intra-state) 
and retail electricity sales, and the effectuation of the dual federal and state jurisdictional 
structure, as authorized by Part II of the FPA, along this “bright line”. 
ESR’s, and other distributed energy resources, now present a landscape where market 
participants can simultaneously provide wholesale and retail services.  At the same 
time, this technology is enabling generation assets to be located at all interconnection-
levels, including behind the meters of traditional retail customers.  Time and technology 
have thus served to blur the line (Nordhaus, 2015) that had provided a relatively clear 
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understanding by electric system stakeholders of a key aspect of the federal and state 
regulatory structure. 
Acknowledging this evolution, FERC outlined two elements in Order No. 841 to justify its 
continued ability to regulate interstate wholesale sales as embodied in issuance of the 
Final Rule.  First, the FPA clearly provided authorization to the Commission to remedy 
the any unjust and unreasonable interstate wholesale electricity rates, including those 
resulting from current market rules and participation models not reflecting an ESR’s full 
capabilities.  Second, the FPA provided no qualification to the Commission’s authority 
regarding the nature of the market participants or the interconnection of relevant 
electrical system components, as long as they were directly impacting interstate 
wholesale electricity sales. 
While aligning with one perspective of FERC’s long-established jurisdictional 
authorization, the justifications leveraged in Order No. 841 do not come without 
vulnerabilities to judicial challenge.  Concerns that Order No. 841 may lead to eventual 
unlawful pre-emption of state authority by FERC in establishing regulations on 
distribution- and BTM-level electric system components were voiced in stakeholder 
comments on the Final Rule.  A similar version of the jurisdictional construct outlined in 
Order No. 841 was upheld for demand response resources with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association ruling.  However, a lack of 
deference to State regulatory authority to allowing prohibition of ESR owners from 
making wholesale market bids, unlike that provided for demand response participation 
models, may reinforce concerns of regulatory overreach by the Commission. 
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FERC’s current jurisdictional approach to distributed energy resources presents 
opportunities to drive unintended adverse effects on the US electric system.  First, 
excessive minimization of the roles of state regulatory agencies can stifle the innovative 
incubation environments provided at the state level that can efficiently drive the 
technological innovations sought by FERC to enable increased interstate wholesale 
electric market competition.  Second, wholesale market design developed in a vacuum 
on the federal/regional level may introduce unintended reliability risks to the electric 
system arising from market and grid performance issues arising at the state and local 
levels.  Finally, any rollback in the interstate wholesale electric market processes due to 
regulatory overreach by FERC will create uncertainty in the existing regulatory regime 
experienced by ESR’s.  This uncertainty will drive unwanted opportunities for 
investment gaps in the development and commissioning of ESR’s and other distributed 
energy resources.  Continued, active engagement between FERC and its State-level 
counterparts will become increasingly important to avoid these undesirable outcomes, 
especially as the types of mature distributed energy resources increases and their use 
in wholesale electric markets accelerates. 
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Chapter 4 Assessment of Proposed RTO/ISO Market and Tariff 
Revisions 
4.1 Order No. 841 Compliance Plan Filings 
In alignment with the action timelines required by Order No. 841, the six ISO/RTO’s filed 
their proposed Tariff revisions on December 3, 2018.  In addition to the red-lined Tariff 
versions, the filings also required a presentation of the justification as to how the Tariff 
updates would comply with the Order No. 841 Final Rule requirements for the ESR 
participation model and the prices paid for ESR charging used for subsequent 
wholesale transaction.  The relevant docket under which the respective Tariff proposals 
were filed are presented in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1: FERC Dockets: ISO/RTO Order No. 841 Compliance Plan Filings 
ISO/RTO FERC Docket57 
California ISO (CAISO) ER19-468 
ISO New England (ISO-NE) ER19-470 
Midwest ISO (MISO) ER19-465 
New York ISO (NYISO) ER19-467 
PJM Interconnection 
ER19-469 (Markets and Operations Proposal) 
ER19-462 (Accounting Proposal) 
Southwest Power Pool (SPP) ER19-460 
The Energy Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is not subject to the requirements to 
submit Tariff updates in compliance with Order No. 841 because the operation of 
                                                          
57 FERC dockets can be accessed at https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/docket_search.asp 
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ERCOT’s wholly intrastate transmission system is outside the jurisdiction established for 
FERC under the Federal Power Act.  Despite the absence of such an obligation, 
ERCOT is maintaining awareness of the activities that other ISO/RTO’s have 
undertaken in order to “help inform its own future processes related to the integration of 
electric storage resources” (ERCOT, 2019b). 
Line-by-line analysis of the red-lined versions of the proposed tariff revisions from the 
six in-scope RTO/ISO/s would be an exhaustive method to outlining the approaches 
proposed for establishing the energy storage-specific participation models. Yet this 
approach risks missing the forest through the trees.  Therefore, this chapter will attempt 
to tabulate and discuss key themes and approaches taken by the RTO/ISO’s within their 
proposed participation models.  Additionally, a brief overview of the compliance 
deficiency letters sent by FERC on April 1, 2019 to each of the RTO/ISO’s will be 
provided as an assessment of the Commission’s outstanding compliance concerns with 
the proposed compliance plans. 
4.2 Proposed Participation Models 
This section will provide a tabulation of the participation models proposed by the 
RTO/ISO’s, with a brief discussion on the different paths taken to develop these models.  
This overview is followed by a presentation of select elements of the participation 
models and an explanation of the use of the resource types in relation to participation 
models.  Finally, specific details of the role of the proposed participation models in the 
RTO/ISO unit commitment and dispatch process are discussed. 
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Overview of Proposed Participation Models 
In line with the flexibility provided by Order No. 841 to comply with the requirements to 
establish ESR participation models, the compliance plans from the RTO/ISO’s each 
have unique features designed to best fit with existing market structure and supporting 
infrastructure elements (e.g., market optimization software).  As shown in Table 4-2, 
each RTO/ISO has provided one or more participation model under which storage 
resources can bid for or offer to provide service through wholesale markets. 
The effort a given RTO/ISO had invested, prior to Order No. 841 becoming effective, 
towards developing market structures enable storage resource participation, had a large 
impact on the proposed ESR participation models.  For example, CAISO had worked for 
several years to develop and implement the Non-Generator Resource (NGR) 
participation model (CAISO, 2018).  CAISO’s participation plan therefore has attempted 
to justify compliance of the NGR model with the Order No. 841 requirements. 
Conversely, SPP had not previously needed to support methods for storage resource 
participation beyond that needed for existing PHES resources (FERC, 2019c).  As such, 
SPP added new tariff elements that were often taken directly from the Order itself.   
Other RTO/ISO’s had previously allowed participation by newer storage technologies, 
but didn’t provide for the full participation called for in the Final Rule.  In such cases, the 
compliance plans adapted existing tariff elements to fill the gaps necessary to meet the 
Final Rule requirements.  PJM modified an existing Energy Storage Resource model to 
permit for energy withdrawals (FERC, 2019b).  In a similar fashion, ISO-NE made 
significant progress in vetting a platform enabling wholesale market participation by  
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Table 4-2: Proposed Participation Model and Resource Types 
ISO/RTO Participation Model Model Details Available Resource Types 
CAISO Non-Generator Resource 
(NGR) 
Primary participation model for common storage 
technologies 
• Operates as either Generation or Load 
• Dispatchable to any operating level, seamlessly over 
entire capacity range 
• Constrained by a MWh limit to generate or consume 
Energy 
• Can elect to use Regulation Energy Management for 
more efficient capacity bids into Day-Ahead (DA) 
regulation markets 
 
Pumped-Storage Hydro Units • Used for hydroelectric dams capable of producing 
electricity and pumping water for later energy 
production 
• Operates as either Generation or Load 
• Generating Unit (injection) 
• Participating Load (withdrawal) 
Demand Response Resource • Provides dispatchable demand (withdrawal) 
• Generally used by Behind-the-Meter (BTM) retail 
customers and aggregated resources 
• Proxy Demand Resources (traditional 
demand response) 
• Reliability Demand Resources 
(dispatched near or at system 
emergency) 
ISO-NE Energy Storage Facility – 
Continuous 
• Transitions seamlessly (< 10 minutes) between 
charging and discharging 
• Dispatchable to any operating level over entire 
capacity range 
• Generator Asset (GA) (injection) 
• Dispatchable Asset Related Demand 
(DARD) (withdrawal) 
• Alternative Technology Regulation 
Resource (ATRR) (Regulation) 
Energy Storage Facility – 
Binary 
Extends PHES storage treatment to other storage 
technologies 
• Can’t instantly (<10 minutes) switch from charging to 
discharging 
• GA (injection and regulation) 
• DARD (withdrawal) available starting in 
2024 
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Table 4-2: Proposed Participation Model and Resource Types (cont’d) 
ISO/RTO Participation Model Model Details Available Resource Types 
MISO Electric Storage Resource • Includes all technologies and/or storage mediums 
• Must be physically located within MISO Balancing 
Authority Area 
 
NYISO Energy Storage Resource • Dispatchable to any operating level, seamlessly over 
entire capacity range 
• Continuous bid curves across full operating range 
• Dispatch-only resources (DA and Real Time (RT) 
Energy Markets only) 
• Does not include BTM Net Generation Resources 
• Energy injection and withdrawal must occur at the 
same location 
• Capable of sustained injection at 0.1 MW for at least 
1 hour 
• Supplier (provides capacity, demand 
reductions, energy or ancillary services) 
• Withdrawal-Eligible Generator  
Generator • Injection-only resource  
Energy Limited Resources • Not capable of continuous operation on a daily basis 
• Must be capable of operating for at least 4 consecutive 
hours each day 
• Accommodates “infeasible” operating range around 
0 MW 
• Supplier (provides capacity, demand 
reductions, energy or ancillary services) 
• Withdrawal-Eligible Generator  
Limited Energy Storage 
Resource 
• Regulation Service provision only 
• Not capable of sustaining continuous operation at 
maximum Energy withdrawal or injection limits for at 
least 1 hour 
 
Demand Response Programs • Capable of being dispatched to curtail Load • Demand Side Resource 
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Table 4-2: Proposed Participation Model and Resource Types (cont’d) 
ISO/RTO Participation Model • Model Details Available Resource Types 
PJM Energy Storage Resource • Expands role to also include Market Buyer 
(withdrawal) 
• Emphasizes real time dispatchability and price setting; 
no optimization in DA Market 
• Participates in Energy, Capacity and/or Ancillary 
Services Markets 
• Participation model selection to occur on annual basis 
 
Capacity Storage Resource • Expands role to also include Market Buyer (withdrawal) 
• Emphasizes real time dispatchability and price setting; 
no optimization in DA Market 
• Participates in the Reliability Pricing Model or 
otherwise treated as capacity 
• Participation model selection to occur on annual basis 
 
Pumped Hydro Storage 
Resource 
• Developed for large pumped hydro storage sources 
(min. 500 MW) that can be turn on/off quickly 
• Utilizes an optimizer to establish DA Energy Market 
schedules 
• Not scalable to small, fast-responding systems 
 
SPP Energy Storage Resource • Introduction of dispatchable Energy withdrawal to 
SPP’s Markets 
• Excludes resources physically incapable of or 
contractually barred from injecting Energy to the 
Transmission System 
• Dispatchable to any operating level, seamlessly over 
entire capacity range 
• Resources with discontinuous Energy Offer Curves 
across 0 MW need to choose to offer either supply or 
demand 
• Market Storage Resource 
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battery storage technologies.  A plan based on these earlier efforts was filed with the 
Commission on October 10, 2018 (ISO-NE, 2018b), but was later modified to address 
known compliance gaps with the Final Rule Requirements (ISO-NE, 2018c). 
Participation Models Elements and Resource Types 
Some RTO/ISO’s offer multiple participation models available to storage resources, with 
the resource owner provided the discretion to select a given model as required per the 
Final Rule.  PJM and CAISO provide models specifically geared toward PHES 
resources, while ISO-NE offers a Binary Storage Resource model originally designed 
for PHES resources that was recently broadened to allow use by any resource that can’t 
instantaneously switch (i.e., in less than 10 minutes) between charging and discharging.  
PJM provides separate models for storage resource seeking to provide either general 
services (e.g., energy, capacity and ancillary services) or exclusively capacity services; 
model election can be updated on an annual basis by the resource owner.  NYISO 
instead has proposed participation models based on the ability to provide daily 
continuous operation. 
While compliance with the Final Rule requirements is ensures the availability of at least 
one compliant participation model, there is no requirement that all participation models 
available to storage resources are compliant.  Thus, there are still participation models 
available to storage resources, in cases where RTO/ISO’s offer multiple options, that 
will not comply with the Final Rule requirements.  An obvious example are the demand 
response models offered by NYISO and CAISO, which can be utilized by storage 
resources, but only allow resources to be dispatched for energy withdrawal. 
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Finally, some RTO/ISO additionally use the concept of a resource type, or alternatively, 
a registration type, along with participation models.  As indicated in Chapter 2, FERC 
refers to participation models as the tariff provisions applicable to specific resource 
types.  Resource types, however, is not a term explicitly defined in the compliance plans 
or tariffs, but is used here to refer to the classification of an asset under which it will be 
registered to participate in a given market or provide specific services.  Table 4-2 
indicates the various resource types available for specific participation models provided 
for storage resources by the various RTO/ISO’s.  Resource type registration can be 
applied to specific participation models, as shown in Figure 4-1 for the SPP Market 
Storage Resource, which only applies to the Energy Storage Resource participation 
model.   
 
Figure 4-1: SPP Energy Storage Participation Model and Resource Type 
More complex relationships can exist between participation models and resources, such 
as that shown in Figure 4-2 for the ISO-NE Energy Storage Facility-related resource 
types.  Assets registered as a Continuous Storage Facility (CSF) must be registered for   
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Figure 4-2: ISO-NE Energy Storage Participation Models and Resource Types58 
three additional resource types: (1) a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand (DARD) to 
provide energy withdrawals, (2) and Generator Asset (GA) to provide energy injections, 
and an Alternate Technology Regulation Resource (ATRR) in order to provide 
regulation services.  However, the DARD, GA and ATRR resource types are not limited 
to the registration of Continuous Storage Facilities; Figure 4-2 also displays the 
                                                          
58 Portions of Figure 4-2 were adapted from (Peet, Asselin, & Pant, 2019) 
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resource types for which a Binary Storage Facility would need to be registered (i.e., 
DARD and GA). 
Unit Commitment and Dispatch – Storage Resource Limitations 
The proposed participation models take a variety of approaches to unit commitment and 
dispatch.  These approaches provide insights into the capabilities of a given RTO/ISO’s 
market processes and infrastructure, and how the current storage technology operation 
capabilities are perceived.  In the case the RTO/ISO day-ahead and real-time markets, 
the following generic definitions can be utilized for unit commitment and dispatch: 
Unit Commitment:  The process of creating a schedule of resources to be in a specific 
operating state (e.g., “On” or “Off”) for specific market intervals, utilizing participant-
provided bid/offer data and resource operating constraints 
Dispatch: Use of resources assigned via a previous unit commitment process, or those 
currently available to be utilized, to provide specific grid services in a specific market 
interval 
A number of RTO/ISO’s place restrictions on the unit commitment process for resources 
using ESR participation models.  One common restriction is the required use of a 
continuous bid curve covering the quantities of energy to be injected or withdrawn for a 
given price.  Continuous bid curves across the whole injection/withdrawal range require 
the absence of operational discontinuities around 0 MW than can result from finite 
minimum charging/discharging limits and times, or non-instantaneous ramp rates.  
Therefore, a requirement for continuous bid curves implies that storage resources must 
serve as dispatch-only resources or, from an equivalent operational perspective, have 
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no technical constraints preventing dispatch anywhere along the provided bid curve 
range for any market interval.  
NYISO’s Energy Storage Resource and ISO-NE’s CSF both explicitly require 
continuous bid curves, but their respective participation models approach the lack of 
commitment availability somewhat differently.  NYISO’s Energy Storage Resource is 
explicitly defined as a dispatch-only resource (NYISO, 2018b).  NYISO has indicated 
that the need for requiring continuous bid curves originated specifically from limitations 
with the existing unit commitment software; timely solutions for the DA and RT-Market 
unit commitments became infeasible with inclusion of as little as eight such non-
continuous resources.  NYISO does acknowledge that such limitations are currently 
acceptable for current storage technologies (e.g., battery storage) that would potentially 
be used within its territory, but may not provide for the technologically-agnostic 
participation required by the Final Rule.  As discussed below in Section 4-4, this gap 
has been noted by the Commission; it is not yet known how NYISO will ultimately 
address this gap in the near term. 
In comparison, ISO-NE does include CSF’s in its unit commitment process.  However, 
various bid parameters essential for the commitment process must be set to 0 (e.g., 
Economic Minimum Limit, Minimum Run Time, Start-up Fees, etc.), indicating that such 
resources can be dispatched during any interval in which it has submitted a bid curve.  It 
should be noted that ISO-NE does provide some allowance for storage resources with 
operational limit preventing instantaneous switching between charging and discharging 
through the ability to utilize the alternate Binary Storage Facility participation model.  
The services that a Binary Storage Facility is permitted to provide is commensurately 
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limited, though; the longer switch time precludes provision of regulatory reserves and 
the mechanism to register such facilities to provide energy withdrawals is not planned to 
be available until 2024. 
MISO and PJM take a similar approach to unit and commitment and dispatch as ISO-
NE, leveraging details of submitted bid curves.  These RTO/ISO’s employ an additional 
designation, a resource’s commitment status, to inform the commitment process of how 
to schedule the respective storage resources.  Both regions utilize a range of 
commitment status specifications (e.g., Continuous, Charge, Discharge, etc.) providing 
general information on how the RTO/ISO can commit the associated storage resource.  
Electric Storage Resources in MISO markets and Energy Storage Resources in PJM 
markets do have the option to offer both energy injection and withdrawal in a given 
interval when designating a Continuous commitment status (FERC, 2019b; MISO, 
2018).  Such storage resources must provide a continuous bid curve over its entire 
submitted operating range, or equivalently, provide no start-up or ramp rate limitations.  
As discussed above, requirements for such continuous bid curves are comparable to a 
“dispatch-only” operation state, even when nominally included the storage resource in 
the unit commitment process.  Storage resource with relevant operating limitations can 
still submit bid curves for a given interval, but instead must submit offers for either 
energy injection or withdrawal in a single market interval, and designating a commitment 
status of either “Charge” or “Discharge”59. 
                                                          
59 MISO has additional Commitment Status designations including those related to charging and 
discharging under emergency conditions.  However, the analysis focuses primarily on normal grid 
operating conditions. 
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One interesting element of the MISO and PJM commitment process involves some of 
the time-related bidding parameters (e.g., Minimum/Maximum Run Time, etc.) that are 
critical operational limitations of conventional resources bidding into the commitment 
process.  Both MISO and PJM allow storage resources with a Continuous commitment 
mode to submit values for such parameters, but parameter submission is optional; 
submitted values are either not used in the unit commitment process (MISO) or storage 
resources are expected to manage their effective commitment status through other 
means (PJM).  While MISO and PJM include justifications in their respective compliance 
plans as to why these approaches do comply with the requirements of the Order, 
especially regarding optional submission of specific bidding parameters, FERC has not 
initially accepted such proposals with submission of further explanation (see Section 4-4 
below). 
SPP’s approach to unit commitment and dispatch is a simpler version of that used by 
MISO and PJM; a Market Storage Resources (MSR) can only provide energy injection 
and withdrawal bids if the associated bid reflects an ability to be continually 
dispatchable across its entire operation range, including 0 MW, for a given market 
interval.  Otherwise, an MSR would need to choose to provide offers for either energy 
injection of withdrawal for specific market intervals. 
CAISO’s unit commitment and dispatch process for NGR’s appears to provide the 
greatest amount of flexibility for a variety of storage operational characteristics.  A single 
bid curve covering a resource’s operational range must be submitted.  While the 
compliance filing does not contain any requirements about allowances for 
discontinuities in the bid curve, it clearly states that some unit-commitment-related 
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bidding parameters (see below) can be submitted for a given resource, typically as 
master file parameters, with the parameter values being respected during as part of the 
unit commitment process and dispatch in the Day-Ahead and Real Time markets.  
Allowance for and respect of non-zero values for Minimum Load or non-instantaneous 
Ramp Rates are thus a mechanism for allowing non-continuous storage resources (i.e., 
dispatch-only assets incapable of instantaneous transition from energy injection to 
withdrawal across its entire operational range) to participate in the unit commitment 
process and dispatch utilizing the NGR participation model. 
4.3 Overview of Proposed Bid Parameters 
While details of the participation models and associated resource types are important 
elements describing how storage resources will interact with the respective RTO/ISO 
wholesale markets, the significance of the bidding parameters adopted for the 
participation models can’t be understated.  Bidding parameters provide clear, 
quantitative boundaries to storage resource operational capabilities and operating limits.  
These values are utilized by the RTO/ISO’s to ensure that feasible dispatch schedules 
are calculated in both day-ahead and real-time markets and for provision of a variety of 
ancillary services.   
The following section provides a tabulation of the bidding parameters proposed by the 
RTO/ISO’s in their compliance plans, including their relation to a corresponding Final 
Rule bidding parameter, and where needed for clarity, RTO-specific definition elements 
and parameter utilization details.  Table 4-3 provides a guide to the subsequent tables 
of proposed bidding parameters, which are delineated by the same parameter 
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categorization used in Chapter 2.  RTO/ISO’s were allowed to propose bidding 
parameters beyond those required in the Final Rule, as long their use does not 
introduce barriers to storage resource providing services for which they are physically 
and operational capable of.  These additional parameters are included in Table 4-7. 
Table 4-3: Overview of Tables Summarizing RTO/ISO-Specific Bidding Parameter 
Proposals 
Bid Parameter Proposal 
Summary 
Bidding Parameter 
Category 
Order No. 841 Bidding 
Parameter Nomenclature 
Table 4-4 Charge States and Rates • State of Charge 
• Maximum State of Charge 
• Minimum State of Charge 
• Maximum Charge Limit 
• Maximum Discharge Limit 
Table 4-5 Operational Durations • Minimum Charge Time 
• Maximum Charge Time 
• Minimum Run Time 
• Maximum Run Time 
Table 4-6 Improved Service 
Procurement Efficiency 
• Minimum Discharge Limit 
• Minimum Charge Limit 
• Discharge Ramp Rate 
• Charge Ramp Rate 
Table 4-7 Additional Parameters Various 
The bidding parameters, as indicated in the tables below, can generally be submitted in 
two ways: (1) bid elements, or (2) master file parameters.  Parameter values submitted 
as bid elements are specific to a given market interval and can be expected to change 
between market intervals.  In contrast, master file parameters can represent a relatively 
static operational limit, and RTO/ISO’s may impose limits on the update frequency (e.g., 
on an annual basis). 
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Many of the proposed bidding parameters from each of the six RTO/ISO’s are either 
identical to those indicated in the Final Rule, or differ only in the naming of the 
parameter.  However, the approaches proposed by CAISO, PJM, and, to a more limited 
extent, NYISO to the use of a large portion of the bidding parameters stands out. 
CAISO proposed that the need to submit values for a range of bidding parameters 
would be left to the discretion of the storage resource owner (CAISO, 2018).  These 
parameters include to the Minimum/Maximum State of Charge, Minimum 
Charge/Discharge Limits (i.e., CAISO’s proposed Minimum Load parameter) and Ramp 
Rates.  Conversely, the Minimum/Maximum Charge Times and Minimum/Maximum Run 
Times would not be accepted.  Limits related to the optional parameters, if submitted, 
would be respected during the dispatch schedule optimization runs, whereas the limits 
represented by the unaccepted parameters would need to be managed indirectly via 
other parameter values and bid submissions elements (e.g., State of Charge Limits, 
Minimum/Maximum Energy Limits and the submitted bid curves). 
In a similar fashion CAISO does not require submission of Minimum/Maximum State of 
Charge, Minimum/Maximum Charge Times and Minimum/Maximum Run Times.  
However, these parameter values would not be utilized in any fashion during the 
dispatch schedule optimization runs.  Management of such physical and operational 
limits are instead explicitly left to the storage resource owner via the indirect controls 
provided by self-management of the resource’s State of Charge. 
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Table 4-4: Bid Parameters: Charge States and Rates 
ISO/RTO 
ISO/RTO-Specific Proposed Parameter Name and Description 
State of Charge 
Maximum State of 
Charge 
Minimum State of 
Charge 
Maximum Charge 
Limit 
Maximum 
Discharge Limit 
CAISO State of Charge 
If State of Charge is 
managed by CAISO, 
value is provided through 
bidding and master file 
parameters 
If State of Charge is self-
managed, value is 
provided through bidding 
only 
NGR’s allowed to include 
in bids; if not included, 
CAISO utilizes previous 
state of charge 
If providing ancillary 
services, must provide 
telemetered value every 
four seconds 
Maximum State of 
Charge 
Not required to be 
submitted if NGR self-
manages state of charge 
and charge/ discharge 
limits 
If submitted, market 
optimization process 
respects limits 
Filed as a master file 
parameter 
Minimum State of 
Charge 
Not required to be 
submitted if NGR self-
manages state of charge 
and charge/ discharge 
limits 
If submitted, market 
optimization process 
respects limits 
Filed as a master file 
parameter 
Maximum Charge Limit 
Not required to be 
submitted if NGR self-
manages state of charge 
and charge/ discharge 
limits 
If submitted, market 
optimization process 
respects limits 
Filed as a master file 
parameter 
Maximum Discharge 
Limit 
Not explicitly mentioned, 
but presumably managed 
in identical fashion as 
Maximum Charge Limit 
ISO-NE Available Energy 
MWh’s of stored energy available for economic dispatch 
Corresponds to State of Charge minus Minimum State of Charge 
Value to be telemetered for both Continuous and Binary Storage Facilities 
Maximum Consumption 
Limit 
Provided by all DARD’s as 
part of Demand Bids in 
DA and RT Energy 
Markets 
Economic Maximum 
Limit 
Provided by all GA’s as 
part of Supply Offers in 
DA and RT Energy 
Markets 
Available Storage 
MWh’s of unused storage available for economic dispatch of consumption 
Corresponds to State of Charge minus Maximum State of Charge 
Value to be telemetered for both Continuous and Binary Storage Facilities 
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Table 4-4: Bid Parameters: Charge States and Rates (cont’d) 
ISO/RTO 
ISO/RTO-Specific Proposed Parameter Name and Description 
State of Charge 
Maximum State of 
Charge 
Minimum State of 
Charge 
Maximum Charge 
Limit 
Maximum 
Discharge Limit 
MISO 
State of Charge 
Market dispatch will 
monitor during normal and 
Emergency system 
conditions 
Parameter must be 
managed by ESR’s (not 
MISO) 
Maximum Energy 
Storage Level 
Market dispatch will 
enforce during normal 
system conditions 
Minimum Energy 
Storage Level 
Market dispatch will 
enforce during normal 
system conditions 
Hourly Economic 
Maximum Charge Limit 
Market dispatch will 
enforce during normal 
system conditions 
Hourly Economic 
Maximum Discharge 
Limit 
Market dispatch will 
enforce during normal 
system conditions 
Emergency Maximum 
Energy Storage Level 
Market dispatch will 
enforce during Emergency 
system conditions 
Emergency Minimum 
Energy Storage Level 
Market dispatch will 
enforce during Emergency 
system conditions 
Hourly Emergency 
Maximum Charge Limit 
Market dispatch will 
enforce during Emergency 
system conditions 
Hourly Emergency 
Maximum Discharge 
Limit 
Market dispatch will 
enforce during Emergency 
system conditions 
NYISO Beginning Energy Level 
Provided for both DA and 
RT markets 
Represents Energy Level 
at the beginning of a 
market interval 
Upper Storage Limit 
Provided for both DA and 
RT markets 
Newly implemented for 
ESR’s 
Lower Storage Limit 
Provided for both DA and 
RT markets 
Newly implemented for 
ESR’s 
Lower Operating Limit 
Minimum MW level an 
ESR is willing to operate 
Reflects both charging 
(negative value) and 
discharging (positive 
value) limits 
Can be set lower than 0 
MW if bidding to withdraw 
Energy 
Provided for both DA and 
RT markets 
Upper Operating Limit 
Maximum MW level an 
ESR is willing to operate 
Reflects both charging 
(negative value) and 
discharging (positive 
value) limits 
Can be set lower than 0 
MW if bidding to withdraw 
Energy 
Must submit 
corresponding Normal 
and Emergency Upper 
Operating Limits (no 
greater than Upper 
Operating Limit) 
Provided for both DA and 
RT markets 
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Table 4-4: Bid Parameters: Charge States and Rates (cont’d) 
ISO/RTO 
ISO/RTO-Specific Proposed Parameter Name and Description 
State of Charge 
Maximum State of 
Charge 
Minimum State of 
Charge 
Maximum Charge 
Limit 
Maximum 
Discharge Limit 
PJM 
State of Charge 
Required to be 
telemetered in real time 
for all ESR’s 
Data will not be used to 
optimize ESR use across 
energy market intervals 
Maximum State of 
Charge 
Not required to be 
submitted 
Parameters will not be 
used to make commitment 
decisions when using the 
ESR Participation model 
Minimum State of 
Charge 
Not required to be 
submitted 
Parameters will not be 
used to make commitment 
decisions when using the 
ESR Participation model 
Maximum Charge Limit 
Used for offering in the 
Day-ahead Energy Market 
and RT Energy market 
(via RT parameter 
updates) 
Necessary to ensure ESR 
dispatch within 
operational range 
Maximum Discharge 
Limit 
Used for offering in the 
Day-ahead Energy Market 
and RT Energy market 
(via RT parameter 
updates) 
Necessary to ensure ESR 
dispatch within 
operational range 
SPP 
State of Charge 
Used for RT Balancing 
Market (RTBM) 
Instantaneous values 
obtained from telemetered 
data – thus, not really a 
submitted parameter 
Maximum State of 
Charge 
Minimum State of 
Charge 
Maximum Charge Limit 
For normal operating 
conditions 
Maximum Discharge 
Limit  
For Emergency Condition 
State of Charge 
Forecasted  
Used for DA Market and 
DA Reliability Unit 
Commitment (RUC) 
Project value for 
beginning of each market 
interval 
Maximum Emergency 
Charge Limit 
For normal operating 
conditions 
Maximum Emergency 
Discharge Limit 
For Emergency Condition 
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Table 4-5: Bid Parameters: Operational Durations 
ISO/RTO 
ISO/RTO-Specific Proposed Parameter Name and Description 
Minimum Charge Time Maximum Charge Time Minimum Run Time Maximum Run Time 
CAISO N/A 
Managed through the optional state of charge parameters, minimum and maximum continuous energy limits and submitted bid curve 
ISO-NE 
Minimum Run Time 
Must be included in offer/bid data 
for GA’s and DARD’s, 
respectively, in DA and RT 
Energy Markets 
Binary Storage Facilities value 
must be no more than 1 hour 
Required value of 0 for CSF 
(always committed) 
Available Energy 
MWh’s of stored energy available 
for economic dispatch 
Corresponds to State of Charge 
minus Minimum State of Charge 
Value to be telemetered for both 
Continuous and Binary Storage 
Facilities 
Minimum Run Time 
Must be included in offer/bid data 
for GA’s and DARD’s, 
respectively, in DA and RT 
Energy Markets 
Binary Storage Facilities value 
must be no more than 1 hour 
Required value of 0 for CSF 
(always committed) 
Available Energy 
MWh’s of stored energy available 
for economic dispatch 
Corresponds to State of Charge 
minus Minimum State of Charge 
Value to be telemetered for both 
Continuous and Binary Storage 
Facilities 
Available Storage 
MWh’s of unused storage 
available for economic dispatch of 
consumption 
Corresponds to State of Charge 
minus Maximum State of Charge 
Value to be telemetered for both 
Continuous and Binary Storage 
Facilities 
Available Storage 
MWh’s of unused storage 
available for economic dispatch of 
consumption 
Corresponds to State of Charge 
minus Maximum State of Charge 
Value to be telemetered for both 
Continuous and Binary Storage 
Facilities 
MISO 
Minimum Charge Time 
Newly defined parameter 
Parameters will be accepted, but 
must be managed by ESR 
through other parameters (limits 
to commitment algorithm and 
State of Charge management by 
ESR’s) 
Maximum Charge Time 
Newly defined parameter 
Parameters will be accepted, but 
must be managed by ESR 
through other parameters (limits 
to commitment algorithm and 
State of Charge management by 
ESR’s) 
Minimum Discharge Time 
Minimum Run Time already 
defined, but unique parameter 
provided for ESR’s 
Parameters will be accepted, but 
must be managed by ESR 
through other parameters (limits 
to commitment algorithm and 
State of Charge management by 
ESR’s) 
Maximum Discharge Time 
Maximum Run Time already 
defined, but unique parameter 
provided for ESR’s 
Parameters will be accepted, but 
must be managed by ESR 
through other parameters (limits 
to commitment algorithm and 
State of Charge management by 
ESR’s) 
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Table 4-5: Bid Parameters: Operational Durations (cont’d) 
ISO/RTO 
ISO/RTO-Specific Proposed Parameter Name and Description 
Minimum Charge Time Maximum Charge Time Minimum Run Time Maximum Run Time 
NYISO 
N/A 
Not required: ESR’s considered dispatch-only resources 
PJM 
Minimum Charge Time 
Not required to be submitted 
Parameters will not be used to 
make commitment decisions 
when using the ESR Participation 
model 
Maximum Charge Time 
Not required to be submitted 
Parameters will not be used to 
make commitment decisions 
when using the ESR Participation 
model 
Minimum Run Time 
Not required to be submitted 
Parameters will not be used to 
make commitment decisions 
when using the ESR Participation 
model 
Maximum Run Time 
Not required to be submitted 
Parameters will not be used to 
make commitment decisions 
when using the ESR Participation 
model 
SPP 
Minimum Charge Time 
New parameter reflecting bi-
directional nature of MSR’s 
Maximum Charge Time 
New parameter reflecting bi-
directional nature of MSR’s 
Minimum Discharge Time 
New parameter reflecting bi-
directional nature of MSR’s 
Maximum Discharge Time 
New parameter reflecting bi-
directional nature of MSR’s 
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Table 4-6: Bid Parameters: Improved Service Procurement Efficiency 
ISO/RTO 
ISO/RTO-Specific Proposed Parameter Name and Description 
Minimum Discharge 
Limit 
Minimum Charge Limit Discharge Ramp Rate Charge Ramp Rate 
CAISO Minimum Load 
Not required to be submitted 
Minimum sustained operating level at which it can operate at a 
continuous sustained level 
Filed as a master file parameter 
NGR can submit values for both charging and discharging 
Ramp Rate 
Not required to be submitted 
Can be filed as a bid component or master file parameter 
Specific ramp rates can be provided: Operational (for supply), 
Regulation, and Operating Reserve (for Spin and Non-Spin) 
NGR’s can submit two segments for their ramp rates for discharging 
(above 0) and charging (below 0) 
ISO-NE Economic Minimum Limit 
Provided by all DARD’s as part of 
Demand Bids in DA and RT 
Energy Markets 
Required value of 0 MW for CSF 
(fully dispatchable) 
Minimum Consumption Limit 
Provided by all GA’s as part of 
Supply Offers in DA and RT 
Energy Markets 
Required value of 0 MW for CSF 
(fully dispatchable) 
Manual Response Rate 
Rate at which the GA is capable 
of changing 
Must be included in offer/bid data 
for GA’s and DARD’s, 
respectively, in DA and RT 
Energy Markets 
Manual Response Rate 
Rate at which the DARD is 
capable of changing 
Must be included in offer/bid data 
for GA’s and DARD’s, 
respectively, in DA and RT 
Energy Markets 
MISO 
Hourly Economic Minimum 
Charge Limit 
Market dispatch will enforce 
during normal system conditions 
Hourly Economic Minimum 
Discharge Limit 
Market dispatch will enforce 
during normal system conditions 
Hourly Discharge Ramp Rate  
Rate for moving from zero output 
to Hourly Economic Maximum 
Discharge Limit and/or from the 
Hourly Economic Maximum 
Discharge Limit to zero output  
Used in Day-Ahead Energy and 
Operating Reserve Market, and 
all Reliability Assessment 
Commitment processes 
Hourly Charge Ramp Rate 
Rate for moving from zero output 
to Hourly Economic Maximum 
Charge Limit and/or from the 
Hourly Economic Maximum 
Charge Limit to zero output  
Used in Day-Ahead Energy and 
Operating Reserve Market, and 
all Reliability Assessment 
Commitment processes 
Hourly Emergency Minimum 
Charge Limit 
Market dispatch will enforce 
during Emergency system 
conditions 
Hourly Emergency Minimum 
Discharge Limit 
Market dispatch will enforce 
during Emergency system 
conditions 
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Table 4-6: Bid Parameters: Improved Service Procurement Efficiency (cont’d) 
ISO/RTO 
ISO/RTO-Specific Proposed Parameter Name and Description 
Minimum Discharge 
Limit 
Minimum Charge Limit Discharge Ramp Rate Charge Ramp Rate 
NYISO 
Lower Operating Limit 
Minimum MW level an ESR is 
willing to operate 
Reflects both charging (negative 
value) and discharging (positive 
value) limits 
Can’t be set lower than 0 MW if 
not bidding to withdraw Energy 
Provided for both DA and RT 
markets 
Upper Operating Limit 
Maximum MW level an ESR is 
willing to operate 
Reflects both charging (negative 
value) and discharging (positive 
value) limits 
Can be set lower than 0 MW if 
bidding to withdraw Energy 
Must submit corresponding 
Normal and Emergency Upper 
Operating Limits (no greater than 
Upper Operating Limit) 
Provided for both DA and RT 
markets 
Response Rates 
Represents how quickly an ESR can respond to dispatch instructions 
under a variety of operating conditions 
Can represent either speed going from zero output to Maximum 
Charge Limit or zero output to Maximum Discharge Limit 
PJM 
Minimum Discharge Limit 
Used for offering in the Day-
ahead Energy Market and RT 
Energy market (via RT parameter 
updates) 
Necessary to ensure ESR 
dispatch within operational range 
Minimum Charge Limit 
Used for offering in the Day-
ahead Energy Market and RT 
Energy market (via RT parameter 
updates) 
Necessary to ensure ESR 
dispatch within operational range 
Discharge Ramp Rate 
Used for offering in the Day-
ahead Energy Market and RT 
Energy market (via RT parameter 
updates) 
Necessary to ensure ESR 
dispatch within operational range 
Charge Ramp Rate 
Used for offering in the Day-
ahead Energy Market and RT 
Energy market (via RT parameter 
updates) 
Necessary to ensure ESR 
dispatch within operational range 
SPP 
Minimum Discharge Limit 
Identical to Final Rule definition 
Minimum Emergency 
Discharge Limit 
Identical to Final Rule definition 
Minimum Charge Limit 
Identical to Final Rule definition 
Minimum Emergency Charge 
Limit 
Identical to Final Rule definition 
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Table 4-7: Bid Parameters: Additional Parameters 
RTO/ISO Parameter Name Parameter Details 
CAISO Minimum Load Value 
Minimum sustained operating 
level at which it can operate at a 
continuous sustained level 
Not required to be submitted 
All supply and demand models 
can submit values 
ISO NE Minimum Down Time Required for Binary Storage 
Facilities only 
Value must be no more than 1 
hour 
CSF offer parameter value of 0 
only (always committed) 
Notification Time plus Start-up 
Time 
Required for Binary Storage 
Facilities only 
Value must be no more than 1 
hour 
CSF offer parameter value of 0 
only (always committed) 
Start-up Fee CSF offer parameter value of 0 
only (always committed) 
No-Load Fee CSF offer parameter value of 0 
only (always committed) 
Maximum Daily Energy Limit Maximum amount of MWh’s 
expected to generate in the next 
Operating Day 
Applicable to Limited Energy 
Resources only 
Submitted for DA Energy Market 
Bids only 
Maximum Daily Consumption 
Limit 
Maximum number of MWh’s 
expected to consume in the next 
Operating Day 
Applicable to DARD’s only 
Submitted for DA Energy Market 
Bids only 
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Table 4-7: Bid Parameters: Additional Parameters (cont’d) 
RTO/ISO Parameter Name Parameter Details 
SPP Energy Storage Resource 
Loss Factor 
Round-trip efficiency related to 
the amount of Energy an ESR 
loses from charge to discharge 
Used by DA market and DA 
RUC 
Min-to-Off Time Time that it takes to shut down 
(charging or discharging)  
Applicable to all resources 
MISO Hourly Regulation Maximum 
Charge Limit 
Maximum withdrawal level at 
which an ESR can respond to 
automatic control signals 
Hourly Regulation Minimum 
Charge Limit 
Minimum withdrawal level at 
which an ESR can respond to 
automatic control signals 
Hourly Regulation Maximum 
Discharge Limit 
Maximum injection level at 
which an ESR can respond to 
automatic control signals 
Hourly Regulation Minimum 
Discharge Limit 
Minimum injection level at which 
an ESR can respond to 
automatic control signals 
Hourly Electric Storage 
Resource Efficiency Factor 
Operating characteristic of an 
ESR that is the amount of 
increase in Energy Storage 
Level for each 1 MW of Charge 
Energy withdrawn by that ESR 
NYISO Roundtrip Efficiency Ratio of energy injections to 
energy withdrawals 
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NYISO uses a similar, but more limited approach, to the time-related bidding 
parameters: Minimum/Maximum Charge Time and Minimum/Maximum Run Time 
(NYISO, 2018b).  Submission of these bidding parameters is not required by NYISO for 
Energy Storage Resources.  The optional nature of these parameters is primarily 
derived from the explicit categorization of the Energy Storage Resource as a dispatch-
only resource; Charge Time and Run Time parameters are more typically used for 
resources participating in the commitment process.  NYISO does indicate that 
incorporation of Charge Time and Run Time operational limits could occur indirectly 
through use of the Beginning Energy Level and Roundtrip Efficiency bidding parameters 
to ensure development of feasible dispatch schedules. 
The Order did provide RTO/ISO’s with flexibility to incorporate aspects of the thirteen 
bidding parameters, ensuring the physical and operation characteristics of storage 
resources are appropriately reflected in bid submissions.  It is unclear if an extensive 
use of indirect controls for many operational limits normally represented by bidding 
parameters can be demonstrated to provide sufficiently robust assurances that dispatch 
schedules will be feasible or that indirect controls won’t present a wholesale market 
participation challenge that is unique to ESR’s.  Section 4.4, below, discusses initial 
Commission feedback on some of these approaches. 
Several other RTO/ISO’s have incorporated unique features into their bidding parameter 
proposals that are also worth noting.  Both MISO and SPP have proposed use of a 
parallel set of parameters for some operation limits that are specific to Emergency 
Operating conditions (FERC, 2019c; MISO, 2018).  This concern about distinctly 
represent emergency conditions does not seem isolated to storage resources in these 
92 | P a g e  
 
authorities; further research into the origin of explicit emergency limits within MISO and 
SPP may be instructive as to why other RTO/ISO’s have not deemed equivalent 
parameters necessary to ensure reliable transmission system operation. 
ISO-NE has taken a unique approach to submitting information on operational states 
and limits by using two derived parameter values, Available Energy and Available 
Storage (ISO-NE, 2018c).  These values are a conglomeration of the resource’s State 
of Charge and Minimum/Maximum State of Charge limits, and are directly applied to 
reporting the associated State of Charge Limits.  They are also used as an indirect 
representation of the Maximum Charge/Run Time Parameters.  As previously 
discussed, it is not yet clear how robust such indirect measure are for ensuring 
determination of feasible dispatch schedules or for complying with the Final Rule 
requirements (See Section 4-4 below). 
Finally, three of the RTO/ISO’s have felt it beneficial, or even necessary, to implement 
some form of bidding parameter related to storage resource charging efficiency.  Thus 
MISO, NYISO and SPP have all implement parameters reflective of the round-trip 
efficiency of the storage resources (FERC, 2019c; MISO, 2018; NYISO, 2018b).  In 
each of these cases, submission of an efficiency parameter is mandatory and is 
considered necessary to developing accurate market optimization solutions. 
4.4 Participation Model Compliance Deficiencies 
On April 1, 2019, the Commission issued letters to each of the six RTO/ISO’s 
requesting additional information needed to further process the respective compliance 
plans previously filed in December, 2018 (FERC, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d, 2019e, 2019f, 
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2019g).  The RTO/ISO’s are required to file responses within thirty days following the 
Commission’s issuance of the letters or risk rejection of the compliance plan proposal 
filings and incurring delays in implementing the tariff changes needed to meet the 
compliance timeline outlined in the Final Rule. 
Many of the information requests simply required provision of tariff sections citations to 
demonstrate that the relevant elements outlined in the compliance plans would actually 
be applicable to ESR’s.  However, assessment of the requests in these letters from the 
Commission can be a worthwhile effort because they represent FERC’s initial official 
perspective on how the RTO/ISO’s are approach compliance with the Final Rule.  The 
letters may also provide a forward-looking perspective on the additional issues that the 
Commission is contemplating related to energy storage, but that might not be strictly in 
scope of the current Final Rule.  In reviewing the Commission letters, the following 
topics, often relevant to multiple RTO/ISO’s, were considered: ESR definition, ESR 
participation model elements, market participation eligibility, bidding parameters and 
minimum size requirements. 
ESR Definition 
Some RTO/ISO’s took the straightforward approach of directly adopting the Final Rule’s 
definition of an Electric Storage Resource.  At the other extreme, CAISO took the 
equally simple path of adopting no definition in its proposed tariff; CAISO correctly 
points out the absence of any prescription within the Final Rule to formally adopt any 
such definition (CAISO, 2018). 
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Two RTO/ISO’s did propose ESR definitions that were different from that outlined in the 
Final Rule, causing Commission concerns with participation constraints resulting from 
storage resource location constraints and the ability of aggregated storage resources to 
participate using an ESR participation model.  First, MISO included a requirement that 
ESR’s must by “physically located within the MISO Balancing Authority Area” (MISO, 
2018).  This rightfully raises the concern about discriminatory treatment of storage 
resources external to a balancing authority.  Such a concern was likely raised because 
of its explicit inclusion in MISO’s ESR definition, but could apply to any other RTO/ISO; 
other compliance plans have not seemed to clarify if external storage resources would 
subject to identical participation requirements as those physically residing within the 
balancing authority territory.  Second, NYISO’s definition indicated that Energy receipt 
and later injection must occur at the same specified location on the grid (NYISO, 
2018b).  Without any clarification as to what interconnection level is relevant to the 
definition, this requirement around injection/withdrawal co-location was viewed by the 
Commission as potentially preventing at least some forms of aggregated storage 
resources from participating in wholesale electric markets. 
In both cases, the Commission has requested further clarification around the 
effectuation of the localization requirements in the ESR definitions.  Also, as discussed 
below, while the Commission deferred issuing rules for aggregated DER’s as part of 
Order No. 841, they may be using these current compliance plans as a way to probe the 
thinking of various RTO/ISO’s on additional ways of addressing that challenging issue. 
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ESR Participation Model Elements 
As shown in Table 4-2, and allowed per the Order, RTO/ISO’s may have more than one 
participation model available to storage resources.  However, there must be at least one 
participation model, or a combination of models, that comply with all of the ESR 
participation model requirements of the Order for all potential technologies and storage 
medium.  Thus, CAISO was requested to confirm if any of the offered models (e.g., 
NGR, pumped hydro, etc.) actually complied with the Order requirements (CAISO, 
2018).  Similarly, ISO-NE will need to clarify if the combination of the Continuous 
Storage Facility and Binary Storage Facility models are sufficient to ensure the overlying 
ESR participation model is technology-neutral (ISO-NE, 2018c).  In both case, simple 
additional citations of compliance may be all that is required for address FERC 
concerns. 
Market Participation Eligibility 
Several RTO/ISO’s have proposed limitations on market participation eligibility for 
storage resources, or were silent on the ability of storage resources to provide specific 
services.  In one example, the Commission questioned ISO-NE’s proposal to disallow 
provision of capacity in its Forward Capacity Market (FCM) by the ESR-related energy 
withdrawing-DARD resource type(ISO-NE, 2018c); no such limitations were proposed 
for assets capable of refraining from charging by RTO/ISO’s with capacity markets.  
ISO-NE will thus need to demonstrate the unique aspects of its market systems and 
processes precluding provision of capacity services by the DARD resource type. 
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In a similar fashion, NYISO and PJM were requested to explain the absence of 
opportunities for ESR’s to provide specific ancillary services (e.g., reactive power and 
black start support for NYISO and reactive power and non-synchronized reserves for 
PJM) (FERC, 2019b; NYISO, 2018b).  The omissions by NYISO and PJM may simply 
be oversights that arose during the preparation of the respective compliance plans, with 
resolution requiring simple revisions to the tariff updates.   
PJM’s response regarding non-synchronized reserves will be potentially more 
interesting, especially considering its requirement around single continuous bid curves 
for storage resources seeking to operate in a Continuous commitment status.  As 
discussed in Section 4-2 above, such storage resources would not be permitted to 
provide start-up or ramp rate limitations, and are thus required to be dispatchable at any 
point along a submitted bid curve for the requested market interval.  This continuous 
dispatchability is equivalent to requiring a continuously synchronized state for the 
storage resource in the respective market intervals.   
It then becomes less clear how storage resources with finite start-up costs and ramp 
rates could be eligible to provide the full range of services for which they were 
technically capable of (e.g., non-synchronized reserves) using these functionally 
dispatch-only participation models.  Therefore, there may be opportunities for the 
Commission to challenge whether the fairly broad requirement for continuous bid curves 
is sufficient to comply with all elements of the Final Rule.  In fact, FERC also 
approached this issue from the perspective of make-whole payments related to 
commitment (e.g., start-up and no-load) costs, explicitly questioning NYISO if a 
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dispatch-only model accurately reflects such costs as it would for generators using 
existing participation models (NYISO, 2018b). 
Bidding Parameters 
Several RTO/ISO’s chose to implement bidding parameters that were identical to those 
outlined in the Final Rule, or simply differing minor naming differences that were clearly 
connected to the equivalent Final Rule parameters.  Three RTO/ISO’s proposed 
alternate approaches where the Commission felt the justifications provided in the 
respective compliance plans were not sufficient to fully demonstrated compliance.  As 
discussed in Section 4-3 above, CAISO and PJM have proposed to make submission of 
a large number of the bidding parameters optional, instead relying State of Charge self-
management and other key bidding parameters to ensure assignment of feasible 
dispatch instructions to storage resources.  The additional questions on the capability of 
such an approach (CAISO, 2018; FERC, 2019b) seems to be an indication that the 
Commission is not yet convinced about the robustness of CAISO and PJM’s proposal to 
ensure provision of reliably feasible dispatch instructions. 
Delving somewhat into the details of the proposals’ mechanics, FERC requested that 
ISO-NE provide additional information on their proposed use the derived parameters, 
Available Energy and Available Storage (ISO-NE, 2018c).  ISO-NE’s compliance plan 
would require provision of these bidding parameters via real-time telemetry instead of 
through market interval-specific offers from storage resource owners.  Therefore, it isn’t 
clear how ISO-NE would be able to develop feasible solutions for future market intervals 
if they are not receiving any forward-looking values for the Available Energy and 
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Available Storage parameters; other RTO/ISO’s may need to be cautious about relying 
solely on real-time data if the underlying parameters is also needed to establish 
schedules for future market intervals. 
Minimum Size Requirements 
Most compliance plan elements specific to addressing the minimum resource size 
requirements were themselves not controversial, with all RTO/ISO’s presenting their 
proposals for reducing resource size requirements to that called for in the Final Rule: 
100 kW.  The Commission did use the issue of minimum size requirements to request 
additional information related to resource aggregation, even when such tariff elements 
were not directly discussed in the compliance plans.  Specifically, ISO-NE and PJM 
were both asked to explain whether resources smaller than 100 kW could be 
aggregated to meet the minimum size requirements (FERC, 2019b; ISO-NE, 2018c); 
neither compliance plan had directly addressed aggregated resources.  Continued 
engagement between ISO-NE, PJM and FERC as they resolve outstanding concerns 
expressed in the Commission’s letters may provide further elucidation on the FERC’s 
expected outcome from inquiries into storage resource aggregation as it applies to 
Order No. 841 compliance. 
4.5 Conclusions 
With the filing of the Order No. 841 compliance plans by the six in-scope RTO/ISO’s in 
late 2018, the planned efforts to remove barriers to electric storage resources in 
wholesale markets are coming into view.  The compliance plans provide not just the 
proposed tariff revisions necessary to introduce the ESR participation models and 
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pricing for ESR charging, but also the justifications offered by the respective RTO/ISO’s 
attempting to demonstrate full compliance with the Final Rule requirements.  Each 
RTO/ISO proposed the use of one or more participation model that a storage resource 
could be qualified for, with some utilizing additional resource types that are typically 
used to further define operational functions within a given participation model.  Several 
RTO/ISO’s leveraged efforts initiated prior to Order No. 841 becoming effective as a 
basis for elements of their compliance plans; other RTO/ISO’s that might not have had 
significant experience with newer storage technologies more or less adopted 
participation model elements directly from the Final Rule. 
Looking at the proposed participation models on a very granular basis, the RTO/ISO’s 
allow varied roles for ESR’s in their respective unit commitment processes and 
dispatch.  Generally, some form of restriction has been placed on how ESR’s are 
considered in the unit commitment process, typically resulting in consideration of ESR’s 
as dispatch-only resources.  These restrictions are either implicitly (e.g., submission of 
continuous bid curves covering their full operational range when wishing to bid as both 
energy injecting (supply) and withdrawing (load) resources) or explicitly (e.g., NYISO’s 
exclusion of Energy Storage Resources from the commitment process and designation 
as dispatch-only resources on Energy Markets) limit ESR’s to being available for only 
continual dispatch in a given market interval. 
Proposed bidding parameters were tabulated and compared to the associated 
requirements in the Final Rule.  Most of the parameters from each of the six RTO/ISO’s 
are either identical to those indicated in the Final Rule, or differ in the proposed 
parameter naming convention.  However, some notable differences were identified.  
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CAISO, PJM, and, to a more limited extent, NYISO proposed that submission of a range 
of bidding parameters would optional.  These RTO/ISO’s would then rely on indirect 
control of associated operational limits (e.g., through bid curves, other operational limits, 
State of Charge self-management, etc.) to ensure development of feasible dispatch 
schedules.  It is unclear if such an approach can demonstrate sufficiently robust 
assurances that dispatch schedules will be feasible or not present wholesale market 
participation barriers unique to ESR’s.  Additional bidding parameters not mentioned in 
the Final Rule have been proposed, including those reflecting round-trip charging 
efficiency and emergency operation capabilities. 
Instances where specific operational limits, especially those related to charging and 
running times, would not be allowed to be submitted or respected during the unit 
commitment process where identified.  Such parameters are largely those utilized in the 
unit commitment process, further emphasizing the need for ESR’s to serve as dispatch-
only resources in the proposed participation models. 
A review of the additional information requests made by FERC in early April, 2019 was 
also performed, identifying some of the Commission’s outstanding compliance concerns 
with the proposed compliance plans.  Topics related to ESR definition, ESR 
participation model elements, market participation eligibility, eligibility to participate as 
buyer/seller, bidding parameters and minimum size requirements will require further 
response from the RTO/ISO’s in order to ensure timely approval of the compliance 
plans.  Questions were raised regarding the ability of participation models with 
continuous bid curves requirements, potential lack of run-time parameter submission, 
and no allowance for start-up costs can truly provide ESR’s with participation 
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opportunities that storage technology-neutral and reliably ensure feasible dispatch 
schedules.  Initial response from the RTO/ISO’s on these questions will be available 
shortly, and hopefully providing a glimpse into the extent of future work needed to 
ensure full compliance with the Final Rule’s requirements. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions 
This study has attempted to deepen the understanding of the requirements of and 
responses to Order No.841.  Understanding the impact of the Final Rule presented by 
the Order on the growth of electric storage capacity in the US is a timely endeavor; the 
presence of new storage technologies on the US electric system continues to grow and 
RTO/ISO’s are expected to begin implementation of their associated compliance plans 
in 2019. 
This analysis was developed using the rich sources of information related to the Order 
that became available over the last few years.  These sources have primarily included: 
(1) the Commission’s documented history on development of the Final Rule, (2) 
contents of the Final Rule itself, (3) FERC’s embedded jurisdictional claims and related 
legal precedents, (4) the RTO/ISO’s compliance plans, and (5) FERC’s compliance 
deficiency letters provided to the RTO/ISO’s. 
Final Rule Requirements and Participation Model Effectiveness 
A summary of the Final Rule that became effective in early 2018 with the issuance of 
Order No 841 by FERC has been provided in this report.  The elements of the Final 
Rule are primarily intended to provide a mechanism that can ensure electric storage 
resources are able to participate in wholesale electricity markets to an extent that is 
reflective of a resource’s physical and operation characteristics.  Realizing the 
distinctive capabilities that electric storage resources possess relative to existing 
wholesale market participants, the Commission utilizes a participation model concept as 
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this mechanism.  Building on the definition for an electric storage resource, the 
associated ESR participation model consists of four required elements: 
1. Service Provision Eligibility 
2. Wholesale Market Price Setting 
3. Market Bidding Parameters 
4. Minimum Size Requirements 
Additionally, the Final Rule provides clear compensation requirements (i.e., pricing at 
the relevant nodal LMP) for specific types of energy withdrawals: those performed for 
the purpose of charging ESR’s that re-inject energy back to the grid as part of later 
wholesale transactions.  The Final rule thus differentiates such energy withdrawals from 
conventional loads and end-use applications.  The wholesale nature of these distinctly 
ESR-associated energy withdrawals is now definitively established so as to not unfairly 
disadvantage storage resources when providing grid services via wholesale markets. 
The Commission has made increasing use of resource-specific participation models in 
an effort to broaden wholesale market participation.  Broader participation is seen as a 
path to increased market competition and, ultimately, the lower electricity rates that 
FERC looks for in order to comply with the FPA’s requirement for just and reasonable 
rates.  Participation models can at least partially achieve this intended goal.  The Final 
Rule’s effect on market competition will be achieved primarily through a greater 
realization of merchant value by ESR owners.  Full system benefits derived from 
storage resources extend beyond those revenues realized by ESR owners.  Therefore, 
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economically optimal levels of ESR capacity and service provision will likely not be 
achieved through exclusive use of participation models.   
It is additionally noted that participation models, as currently constructed, are 
revenue/benefit-centric mechanisms; the models provide neither subsidization of new 
technology research and development, nor any direct procurement incentives (e.g., 
procurement credits or financing assistance).  Thus, exclusive use of participation 
models to facilitate ESR capacity growth does not provide any direct downward 
pressure on procurement costs that would further improve benefit/cost considerations 
that are critical to many project valuation processes (e.g., cost effectiveness tests 
detailed in the California Standard Practice Manual (CPUC, 2001)). 
Order No. 841 is thus an important step towards attaining greater electric storage 
resource service provision, and by extension, enabling the concomitant expansion of 
renewable energy penetration.  However, unilateral federal efforts alone are unlikely to 
provide the stimulus needed to achieve economically-optimal utilization of ESR’s and a 
direct impact on all aspects of benefit/cost considerations related to ESR procurement. 
Final Rule Legal Foundations and Jurisdictional Perspectives 
Realization of ESR participation model-derived benefits will be heavily dependent on the 
long-term resilience of the market changes that FERC intends to implement through 
Order No. 841.  The Commission has proactively responded to the technological, 
economic and legislative shifts through its efforts on Order No. 841.  Yet, FERC has still 
relied primarily on a conventional, categorical exercise of its jurisdiction over interstate 
wholesale markets when regulating sub-transmission-level connected ESR’s through 
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Order No. 841’s requirements.  The same shifts that prompted its work on Order 
No. 841 are the same ones that present the Commission with increasing vulnerability to 
judicial review of its jurisdictional approach cited in the Final Rule and the regulatory 
regime change. 
The Commission must now take greater care not to overstep its authorized jurisdiction 
by inadvertently enacted regulations that directly impact retail activities of storage 
resources that are simultaneously interacting in wholesale electric markets.  Such 
regulatory efforts by FERC risk judicial review to determine if federal actions have 
unlawfully preempted the authorities clearly reserved for the States in the Federal 
Power Act.  Overturning established market structures, and the associated increase in 
regulatory uncertainty, will drive increasing investment gaps in the development and 
commissioning of electric storage resources. 
An increasing engagement with the respective State authorities is needed from FERC to 
maintain the momentum that Order No. 841 provides to ESR participation, both at the 
wholesale and retail level.  Alternate approaches to FERC’s current jurisdictional 
practices will be needed to achieve this as well. For example, the efforts to date at 
implementing state-level legislation and mandates associated with electric storage 
procurement point to the potential effectiveness of the innovative incubation 
environments provided at the state level.  Such innovation can be a driving force leading 
to new mature, commissioned technological innovations that the Commission is seeking 
as a way to increase competition in interstate wholesale electric markets.  Harnessing 
best-practices and, where possible, aligning with state-level efforts can hasten the 
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realization of the system-wide benefits that better reflect the full range of services 
available from ESR’s. 
At the same time, unintended reliability risks to the electric system can come from 
market and grid performance driven by distributed energy resources (e.g., ESR’s), 
forcing the slowing or outright halt to storage resource participation growth.  State/local 
entities that operate and regulate the sub-transmission levels of the grid need some 
level of awareness of distribution-level and BTM resource interactions in wholesale 
markets to ensure proper system operation and planning.  Thus, the need for 
cooperative federal- and state-level engagement on ESR participation will only increase 
as ESR capacity and utilization increases. 
RTO/ISO Compliance Plans and Initial Commission Responses 
Details of the various storage resource participation models, as proposed by the six 
RTO/ISO’s in the December, 2018 compliance plan submissions, were tabulated along 
with associated resource types, where applicable.  Some RTO/ISO’s leveraged efforts 
pre-dating Order No. 841 as key elements of one or more proposed ESR participation 
model (e.g., CAISO, PJM and ISO-NE).  Conversely, some RTO/ISO’s had little or no 
previous experience with non-PHES resource participation in the relevant wholesale 
markets (e.g., SPP); such regions relied more heavily on direct adoption of the Final 
Rule participation model elements.   
A review of bidding parameters revealed two aspects of the proposed participation 
models that RTO/ISO’s may need to resolve to the satisfaction of the Commission in 
order to ensure timely approval of the proposed compliance plans.  First, the proposals 
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by some RTO/ISO’s to make extensive use of indirect controls as a means to manage 
numerous ESR physical parameters is not yet sufficiently justified.  As evident in the 
Commission’s compliance letters sent to the RTO/ISO’s in early April, 2019, it is not yet 
clear how the proposed indirect controls will provide sufficient assurance that feasible 
dispatch instructions can be reliably issued under a wide range of operational situations. 
The categorization of some proposed participation models as “dispatch-only”, or the 
requirement to submit continuous bid curves across an ESR’s entire 
charging/discharging operational range, represents a possible hurdle to FERC’s 
approval of the compliance plans for most RTO/ISO’s.  The ESR definition in the Final 
Rule is agnostic to the use of specific storage technology, only requiring a resource to 
have the ability to store energy for later injection to the grid.  Yet, storage resources 
excluded from functional participation in unit commitment processes, or limited in to 
submitting either charging or discharging bids in a given market interval can provide 
barriers to storage resources.  These barriers can be associated with specific 
operational limitations (e.g., non-zero start-up times, finite ramp rates, etc.) or 
entitlement to market participation costs (e.g., start-up costs, no-load costs, etc.).  
Overcoming this technology bias may be significant for some RTO/ISO’s.  For example, 
NYISO’s claimed market optimization software limitations may require significant cost 
and time to accommodate even small numbers of storage resource that can’t submit 
continuous bid curves.  However, greater sharing of best-practices regarding inclusion 
of ESR operational characteristics may be used to provide easier solutions to achieving 
true technology neutrality for the ESR participation models; consideration of CAISO’s 
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claimed ability to respect all operational limits, even with submission of continuous bid 
curves, may hold valuable lessons for other RTO/ISO’s. 
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